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Foreword
The papers presented at the conference held last June,
together with the policy statement of the National Council
on Employment Policy, serve to highlight the importance of
labor force and productivity data systems as a resource for
policy formulation. They also address the concerns of many
about the adequacy and viability of these systems.
According to the Council, the federal government in fiscal
1983 will be spending 20 percent less than it did in 1980 for
labor force and economic data, forcing a decline in the qual
ity and quantity of many data series and curtailment of need
ed research and development. While it seems obvious that
the relative costs and benefits of data systems must be
analyzed in an era of budget constriction, it seems equally
obvious that data systems which accurately capture the net
social impacts of domestic policy are of vital importance to
both policymakers and the general public.
Facts and observations presented in this study are the sole
responsibility of the authors. Their viewpoints do not
necessarily represent the positions of the W. E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research.

Jack R. Woods
Acting Director
Kalamazoo, Michigan
December 1982
IV

Contents
1

Introduction...............................

1

2

Labor Force and Productivity
Measurements: Danger Ahead?
A Policy Statement by The National
Council on Employment Policy.............

3

Policy Analysis and the Current
Population Survey Data
Leon Taub ..............................

23

The Hardship Consequences
of Labor Market Problems
Robert Taggart ..........................

41

Establishment Data and Productivity
Measurements
Elliot Grossman and George Sadler .........

77

Longitudinal Labor Market Data: Sources,
Uses, and Limitations
Orley Ashenfelter and Gary Solon ..........

109

Summing Up (based on selective hearing)
Sar A. Levitan ...........................

127

3

4

5

6

7

What has been happening to the United States' labor force
and productivity data systems? That was the major question
examined at a conference sponsored by the National Council
on Employment Policy held in Washington on June 17,
1982. The Council, a private nonprofit organization with
special interest and expertise in the areas of labor market and
employment and training programs, set out to examine
whether the basic concepts and definitions used in collecting
and reporting labor force and productivity data portray cur
rent conditions and whether the available data are adequate
for policy formulation and evaluation processes.
Joining Council members at this conference were leading
public and private economic and statistical analysts. The
debate during the conference over these issues and the
material presented in the four main Council-sponsored
papers was enlightening and informative, but often also
heated.
American social and economic policies in the early 1980s
have experienced significant changes. The conference ex
plored how existing statistics have been, and can be, used by
policymakers in reaching key decisions. But beyond the
quality and quantity of existing data, the conferees examined
critically the strengths and weaknesses in the American labor
force data system.
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Introduction

This volume contains the papers presented at the con
ference. As published, the papers reflect the comments and
critiques presented during the course of the deliberations.
Based on the proceedings, the Council prepared a brief
policy statement, *'Labor Force and Productivity
Measurements: Danger Ahead." The Council concluded
that the United States' labor force and productivity data
systems face deterioration because of a "starvation budget"
which has forced a decline in the quality and quantity of the
published information and a curtailment of needed research.
While each paper examined one part of the system, the
Council's statement tries to view the system as a whole. It
places American labor force and productivity data
measurements in the context of recent federal budgeting
developments. It took many years to create the system, the
Council cautioned, and it could lose the trust of
policymakers and the general public if it is allowed to
deteriorate.
No econometric model or policy evaluation can be better
than the data on which it is founded. Ideology and basic
values will always play a significant part in this process.
However, sound data can provide a tether that links
policymakers, the media, and the general public with reality.
It is the Council's hope to strengthen this tether and to point
out where it has become weak and may fray unless action is
taken.
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Labor Force
and Productivity Measurements
Danger Ahead
A policy statement by
The National Council on Employment Policy*

Growing Concern
The United States' labor force and productivity data
system faces a serious problem of deterioration at a time
when the American economy is experiencing radical
transformations. Changing public policies, combined with
slumping productivity and other technological and social
forces, are buffeting our society. Compounding the domestic
factors is a growing internationalization in the flows of
capital, commodities and labor, making the United States in
creasingly cognizant of foreign economic conditions.
Given these changes and more recent shifts in social pro
grams, federal spending, taxes, monetary policy and interna
tional markets, measures are necessary to assess the impact
of these transformations. Who in our society has been
*The National Council on Employment Policy is a private nonprofit organization of
academicians and policy experts with a special interest in the areas of labor market and
employment and training programs. This policy statement represents the combined judg
ment of the Council members. Despite divergence of opinion on details, the members
unanimously agreed to this statement.
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helped by the new economic policies, and who is experienc
ing more economic hardship? What tools are available to
track the resulting changes? What sectors have experienced
gains in productivity, and what factors have caused these in
creases? Our public policies and private investment decisions
depend upon these data as billions of dollars literally are
riding on the monthly labor force estimates published by the
U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). An annual rise of 1 percent in unemployment can
unleash various forces that can increase the federal deficit by
some $25 billion, affecting not only millions of lives but also
domestic and foreign financial markets which in turn feed
back on labor market results. Also, estimates of local
unemployment, income and related data determine the size
of allocations for many federal programs.
The thermometer of labor force and productivity
measurements has taken on an added importance. While
politicians cannot rely solely upon statistics, it would be
foolhardy to try to fashion economic policies without con
sidering their impact on the workforce and households as
summarized in our labor force data system. It is no wonder
that President Reagan has displayed an interest not only in
overall labor force data but even in the seasonal adjustment
of labor force estimates one of the most arcane aspects of
these data.
At a time when we need reliable labor force and produc
tivity data, clear danger signals have emerged. First, some
basic concepts have not been updated since the 1930s despite
vast social and economic changes. Second, while our data
system may not be exempt from budget reductions, there are
some cost cutting moves that may save money in the short
run only to wind up costing the nation more in the long run.
Our labor force and productivity estimates should be able to
play a major role in public policy formulation and in helping
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to evaluate the results of these efforts by providing feedback
to alert policymakers concerned with possible mid-course
corrections.
In general, there is much to be proud of in our workforce
data system. However, there are indications that inertia may
be setting in despite the best efforts of many competent and
dedicated government experts. Yet, the data system can be
expanded and kept up to date with minimal costs to help
shed light on the formulation and evaluation of economic
policies. Our data system will deteriorate if we cannot
redesign and modernize it. Depreciation is a factor in this
social investment, just as in our system of public works and
private capital.
All this indicates serious potential problems. It should be
remembered that no law forces households or employers to
participate in the government surveys which generate these
data. Without full public support and trust, the system
would fall apart very rapidly. However, policymakers, the
media and many citizens have increasingly questioned this
data system. It would be wise to consider these rumblings,
for they indicate serious potential problems.
The good news is that the American labor force data
system and productivity estimates remain free from partisan
political influences. On a methodological level the system re
mains one of the world's best and in many ways number
one in terms of statistical sampling techniques and the
utilization of computer technology and analysis. This data
system still represents a standard of excellence that most
other nations strive to emulate.
The bad news is that the system has been far slower in
adopting basic concepts and definitions to reflect current
economic conditions and workforce behavior. This lag has
reduced the system's usefulness in the policy process.
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Economic Hardship
Our current labor force data system often falls short of
providing the necessary information for policy formulation.
It is not just a question of whether or not the unemployment
rate should be jiggled up or down. The real problem centers
in on the basic concepts of what we should measure.
One of the major areas in which the American data system
has experienced the most inertia concerns the concept of
economic hardship. Basing public policy on indices measur
ing the number of people employed and those not employed
but looking for jobs might have been adequate in the 1930s,
but it does not provide the data needed in the 1980s. Given
the massive size of the government's income support system,
the conditions of the working poor, and vast changes in the
composition of the labor force, we should move beyond the
assumption, contained in our current statistics, that people
are either employed or forced into idleness.
In the pre-New Deal days when few needy individuals
received income support and people either worked or starv
ed, these concepts reflected reality. But, for better or worse,
we do not live in such a society. What is required for mean
ingful analysis and public policy direction are new social in
dicators that would not only measure employment, but
would link earnings and income data with labor force status,
time worked and household living conditions. Such indices
would tell us the number of persons who are unable to attain
a socially acceptable standard of living through work.
When the government started its monthly effort to
measure unemployment toward the end of the Great Depres
sion, economic hardship was more directly correlated with
unemployment. Under the conditions of the 1930s, any
job no matter what the rate of pay or hours of work was
considered better than no job. Hence, the length of the ranks
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of the unemployed was an acceptable proxy measure for
deprivation.
The American economy has undergone major institutional
change since the 1930s, and yet the concepts and definitions
used in forming the unemployment statistics have hardly
changed at all. The American economy now includes a vast
transfer payment system carrying an annual price tag in ex
cess of $380 billion or one out of every six dollars of
disposable personal income. Public transfer payments have
an impact on all segments of society, and in fact the vast ma
jority goes to the middle class and affluent. Our concepts
about labor force behavior reflect conditions of the Great
Depression and are not necessarily applicable to today's
labor markets. For example, an individual may be
unemployed and yet receive income support, or be part of a
household with income that may indicate affluence.
However, there is another side to the coin. For millions of
Americans, employment even a full-time job does not of
fer escape from poverty. An individual may be employed
and still live in poverty as defined by the federal government.
A statistical system that reports labor force participation
monthly but pays only scant attention to income and
underemployment is bound to fail as an indicator of real
conditions. We are bound to draw disastrously wrong con
clusions when we use such a statistic as a foundation for
governmental policies.
It is ironic that meteorologists have recognized a similar
problem in their field, and they have devised solutions which
the public uses every day. For example, what makes us un
comfortable during a winter day? The meteorologists' con
cept of the "wind-chill" factor combines temperature with
wind data to produce a realistic and understandable measure
of actual outdoor conditions. The older measure,
temperature, simply does not convey enough information
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about windy, chilly days. On summer days, the
termperature-humidity index combines the factors that make
us uncomfortable. By itself temperature might not make us
uncomfortable, and it must be placed in context with other
factors.
A similar concept should be applied to employment, earn
ings, and household data to provide a realistic measure of
labor market-related economic hardship. The impact of
government policies and the extent to which economic
hardship has been increased or reduced cannot be deter
mined until we forge new statistical concepts for labor force
measurements. Consider two individuals: person "A" works
full-time, full-year at minimum wage and is the only wage
earner in the family. Person "B" has just been laid off, but
is part of a two-person household with the other member
earning $25,000 a year. Common sense would indicate that
"A" should be considered in the economic hardship ranks
while "B" would not be facing deprivation. And yet under
our current concepts "B" is counted as unemployed and
therefore presumably in hardship while "A" would not be
included in our leading measure of labor market pathologies.
The unemployment statistics provide a shaky foundation for
deciding national policy, and they are even of less value in
deciding the allocation of federal funds among states and
local areas.
Congress has recognized these problems on several occa
sions and has mandated BLS to come up with labor marketrelated hardship measures. 1 However, BLS has been very
slow to comply, and its recent first report on the subject fell
short in meeting the concerns expressed in the congressional
mandate. 2 A reporting system that would link labor market
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status with earnings and income should attempt to measure
at a minimum:
Inadequate individual earnings: How many persons
who participate in the workforce during the year are
unable to earn at least the minimum wage equivalent for
their total hours of work availability?
While individual data are important, it is necessary to
place a person's earnings in the context of their
household status and family economic need. For these
reasons, a reporting system should also measure:
Inadequate family earnings: How many workforce
participants are in families whose total wages and
salaries are below the poverty level?
Inadequate family income: How many workforce
participants have family incomes (i.e., earnings plus any
transfer payments and certain in-kind aid) below the
poverty level?
The answers to the above questions can be derived annual
ly from existing labor force data at a minimal cost. The
resulting reporting system can provide important insights in
to labor force operations, 3 including:
One of every four workforce participants failed to earn
the equivalent of the minimum wage for the hours the person
was available for work during 1979. This count of inade
quate individual earnings was nearly 5 times the average
monthly unemployment level and 1.5 times the number who
experienced any unemployment during the entire year.
One of every nine workers lived in families with belowpoverty earnings. The number of workers with inadequate
family earnings was more than double the average annual
unemployed and almost three-quarters the number who ex
perienced any unemployment during the entire year.
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6 percent of the workforce remained in poor families
after receiving income transfers and other earnings sup
plements.
Only half of those who experienced joblessness during
1979 had annual earnings below the minimum wage
equivalent for the hours they were available for work. Less
than one in four resided in families with below-poverty earn
ings. Only one in seven remained in poverty after receipt of
transfer and other earnings supplements.
Low hourly earnings and limited hours of employment,
rather than joblessness, were the major causes of economic
hardship. Four of every ten poor persons above age 15 work
ed in 1980 including 2.7 million low-paid workers employed
full-time year round who lived in families with belowpoverty earnings.
These data illuminate many concerns expressed by labor
market analysts regarding the meaning of labor market
status and economic hardship in our society. These same
measures also show that:
The incidence of inadequate earnings and income is
most prevalent among female workers, minorities, younger
and older labor force participants, and those with limited
education, workers in service jobs, and residents of
nonmetropolitan areas and large central cities. As a general
rule, the burdens of hardship are more maldistributed than
the burdens of unemployment (Figure 1).
Economic hardship is a continuing structural problem,
rising and falling over the business cycle, but changing pro
portionately less than unemployment. Between 1979 and
1980, when average annual unemployment rose by a fourth,
the number of individuals with earnings below the minimum
wage equivalent rose by only a sixth and the number of
workers in families with below-poverty earnings by a
seventh.
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Figure 1. The Rate of Economic Hardship is Higher Than the Rate
of Unemployment for Female and Minority
Labor Force Participants (1980)

Average annual
unemployment

SOURCE: Robert Taggart, Hardship: The Welfare Consequences of Labor Market Prob
lems (Kalamazoo, MI: The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1982).
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During the most recent complete business cycle, be
tween 1974-1980, the poverty incidence among workforce
participants increased because of the declining effectiveness
of the cash transfer safety net.
These data indicate that to significantly alleviate labor
market-related hardship would require a combination of
macroeconomic and targeted structural measures, combined
with expanded income transfers for the working poor.
Economic recovery alone will not solve the economic hard
ship problem of labor force participants. Assuming a 9 per
cent unemployment rate in 1982 and a 5 percent inflation
rate, an estimated 17 million workforce participants are in
families with earnings below the poverty level. But if the
unemployment rate fell to 7 percent and the inflation rate to
2.5 percent, the number of workers living in poverty
households would drop by less than 2 million, and their
families would still need nearly $45 billion in earnings or sup
plements to escape poverty.
This briefly summarized system of measuring the labor
market-related hardship is an indication of what can be done
with available CPS data and minimal expenditures. For all
of these reasons, we strongly recommend that our official
labor force measurement system should include indices link
ing employment with earnings and income along the lines
suggested above. Policymakers need relevant data to form
and evaluate public programs. The lack of such hardship
estimates is a major weakness in the current system.

Productivity and Social Indicators
Another major area of concern focuses on American pro
ductivity data. Given the recent problems with slow growth,
inflation and unemployment, policymakers have become
highly interested in productivity growth rates, and they have
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issued numerous proposals to boost the slumping American
trends.
The traditional concept of productivity considers only
output-per-workhour. In 1981 output-per-workhour, known
as labor productivity, of the private business economy rose
at only one percent compared with a threefold increase in
labor productivity between 1948 and 1973. By the end of the
1970s, not only were labor productivity growth rates slump
ing, but at times they were even negative.
It is commonly assumed that the health of the economy
cannot be restored, and real wage gains cannot be resumed,
until productivity growth rates rise commensurately (Figure
2). At the same time concern is expressed that the United
States has lost some of its former competitive advantage over
foreign nations due to the fact that their productivity growth
rates have tended to be higher than America's. There also
has been a major shift of the American workforce into the
service sector of the economy, and it is much more difficult
to measure productivity in this area than in manufacturing
or agriculture. Even when measured, there is also serious
concern that it may be much more difficult to raise the
output-per-workhour in the service sector.
With so much interest expressed in productivity growth
rates, the data used to measure productivity must face as
close an examination as the concepts of linking employment
with earnings and family income. Also in this field there
have been major advances in the basic concepts of how pro
ductivity should be measured. The more recent concepts
center on total factor productivity rather than on only labor
productivity. Yet these advances still have not been reflected
in our official data system.
Output-per-workhour, based on establishment survey
reports submitted voluntarily by some 165,000 employers,
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Figure 2. Average Annual Compensation Per Full Time
Equivalent Employee Rose Steadily Until
the Mid-1970s
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SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
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does not fully take into consideration or show the influence
of other factors such as capital. A different picture emerges
by looking at total factor productivity which relates output
to all associated inputs. 4 Suppose, for example, that the
labor required to produce a bushel of wheat vastly declines.
Instead of human labor power, the farming process might
become highly energy-intensive (i.e., energy, such as oil,
petroleum-based fertilizer, and machinery, is substituted for
human labor power). Total factor productivity would not
rise as much as output-per-workhour in this case. Given the
recent hikes in energy prices, the substitution of energy for
labor cannot be ignored.
Conventional productivity measures, which concentrate
on labor, may be overstating productivity growth rates. In
1981, total factor productivity rose only 0.4 percent, or 60
percent less than the BLS output-per-workhour figure.
Moreover, the establishment survey is designed so that it ob
tains better productivity data within the goods producing
sector of the economy rather than in the more rapidly grow
ing service sector. In fact, productivity is much more dif
ficult to estimate within the service sector because of the dif
ficulty in measuring units of production.
There are many conceptual and data problems in forming
total factor productivity estimates. For example, how is
capital to be aggregated and measured? How should capital
stock be depreciated so that net capital levels are used in
forming these estimates? The BLS has undertaken research
into these questions, and it does hope by 1983 to make
estimates that move beyond only labor productivity.
Similar to the area of unemployment, productivity
analysis all too often has been hampered by a "one number
syndrome." Labor productivity, like the official unemploy
ment rate, is presumed to illuminate developments it was
never designed to handle. Labor productivity estimates
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measure the change in labor spent per unit of output over
time, and this may be all that is required for some analysis.
However, for certain investment and growth policy decisions
capital, labor and energy substitutions cannot be ignored,
and it is significant to look at a combined measure of all in
put requirements per unit of output over time.

We support BLS efforts to publish productivity estimates
that not only include output-per-workhour but indices that
also report total factor productivity, capital productivity,
and energy productivity.
We also recommend that efforts be expanded to revise the
establishment survey so that it mil better capture productivi
ty and other changes within the rapidly growing service sec
tor.
There are many reasons which can explain the recent
decline in American productivity growth rates, but one key
factor centers in on the concept of externalities which often
are only measured by our social indicators. For example,
prior to environmental laws a firm may have produced a ton
of metal per hour plus an unhealthy level of pollution.
Capital investment to clean up the air may now result in the
firm producing a ton of metal per hour plus a safer environ
ment. However, conventional productivity estimates will not
capture this change since they only look at private produc
tivity levels and not at social productivity that includes exter
nalities.
Social indicators are required to augment the formal
economic data on the labor force. Public investment has
played a significant role in developing these newer data
sources. In general, this public investment in social in
dicators has been sound, and should be continued.
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Longitudinal Data
The current population survey and the establishment
survey the two main samples discussed so far are most
often used to create cross-sectional data, which are like a
snapshot taken at one point in time. Several pictures can be
placed together for a time series, which shows changes over
months and years. While this provides policymakers with
more information, it has problems. The individuals in each
time series observation are, most often, not the same people.
For this type of information, longitudinal data which follow
specific individuals over time can provide a wealth of
knowledge. Longitudinal data can help in such policy related
questions as:
What happens to families when they go through a
divorce? What happens to labor market activity and
earnings? Are the children reduced to poverty?
What are the benefits and costs of specific employ
ment and training programs for different types of in
dividuals? What seems to work best and for whom?
What is the full impact of business cycle conditions
on different types of households?
What are the net impacts of workfare and welfare
programs?
Some of the most important policy-related questions can
best be answered by longitudinal data. Part of the reason
most econometric models failed to predict the major influx
of women into the workforce was because their estimates
were based on cross-sectional data on such variables as a
wife and husband's educational and earnings status. The
cross-sectional picture proved to be misleading.
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The federal government has been the major sponsor of
longitudinal data series. From the point of view of policy
formulation and evaluation, longitudinal data collection and
analysis are highly productive investments of research
dollars. There has been some concern expressed by leading
labor force analysts that, in an effort to cut domestic spend
ing, these efforts will be vastly reduced. 5 It would be a
serious mistake to trim investment in the collection and
analysis of longitudinal data. The fixed costs of beginning or
restarting the collection of data loom much larger than con
tinuing longitudinal sets once started. Research on the labor
force and work-related issues would consequently suffer if
longitudinal data collection were halted or significantly
reduced.
Also, different federal agencies are the sponsors of various
longitudinal surveys. Given the diversity of sponsorship, it is
important to have a means for fostering coordination so as
to avoid both overlap and omission. While cross-sectional
data can tell us "how many," longitudinal data centers on
"who," "why," and "do policies make a difference?"
Sound social investment in data should include significant
allocations to these newer surveys.
We also believe that administrative data can be put to
much better uses than they are currently given in many cases.
The administrative data are already being collected as part of
program operations, and they often can provide a rich
longitudinal data source. In some cases administrative data
remain an untapped gold mine. Government agencies should
further explore linking administrative and survey records.

Misplaced Savings
While strict budget constraints have been applied to most
areas of nondefense spending, there are indications that cer
tain recent decisions in the area of labor force measures may
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be penny wise but pound foolish. For example, six years ago
Congress mandated the establishment of a commission
charged with the responsibility of reviewing the federal
employment and unemployment statistics. Following the re
quirements of the law, in October 1981 Secretary of Labor
Raymond Donovan reported on the disposition of the Na
tional Commission on Employment and Unemployment
Statistics report. His conclusion was that because of
budgetary constraints, he would not implement the commis
sion recommendations that involved added outlays no mat
ter how miniscule the costs and regardless of the potential
returns. 6
Recognizing that this is a period in which policymakers are
reducing public efforts, we believe that the "savings" involv
ed here are not justified even in an era of fiscal constraint.
Policy decisions should not be based solely on gut feeling or
preconceived ideology. Given the vast interest, scope, and
billions of dollars involved in productivity, training and
other labor-related policies, it makes sense to invest in a data
system that produces sound and relevant estimates.
A major tenet of the Reagan administration has been the
desirability of generally reducing the powers of government
and assigning tasks to the lowest possible levels of govern
ment if government intervention is deemed necessary.
Realizing, however, that the federal government cannot give
up all its responsibility of aid to states and localities, the
Reagan administration has favored the disbursement of
federal funds to states through block grants. Yet it would
seem to be unwise for the federal government to leave the
money in state capitols without giving them some guidance
and a helping hand in its disbursement. Economy would cer
tainly not be served if each state developed its own data base.
Accordingly, if the federal funds are to be distributed on the
basis of helping the truly needy or the dependent population,
then it will be necessary for states to possess the necessary
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statistics on which to base allocation decisions. Cognizant of
the costs, the commission still recommended that the present
60,000 household sample of the Current Population Survey
(CPS) be doubled. The current CPS cannot even come close
to accomplishing the job of helping states and local govern
ments make wise decisions based on facts.
But even to keep the CPS a true random sample and to
provide state and local data not now available on such a
disaggregated level in the CPS our data system requires
detailed Census numbers. The 1980 Census cost more than
$1 billion in 1980, and yet the funds to process and tabulate
the state and local data were not provided at the level needed
to meet publicly announced time schedules.
These state and local data are crucial to many other data
series. BLS uses Census data as a benchmark for its sample
survey data. Without an accurate benchmark, the reliability
of estimates produced by a sample survey cannot be verified.
At the same time, these disaggregated estimates are needed
to form policies that move beyond our general
macroeconomic plans. Many of our difficulties should be
addressed on the microeconomic level, but data from sources
such as the CPS often are not good enough to accomplish
this needed task. 7
There are numerous signs that our labor force data system
appears to be in for some tough times. There is a major dif
ference between rational budget restraints and a starvation
diet. The irony is that the latter, in the long run, will wind up
costing us more money than the former.
For example, an investment of funds in the redesign of the
Current Population Survey will not only save millions of
dollars in operating costs over the next decade, but it would
also assure the maintenance of the quality of the critical
statistics which come from this source. Without a redesign,
the quality of the data on which so many national and state
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and local decisions are made can be expected to deteriorate
over time.
In fiscal 1983 the federal government will be spending
about 20 percent less than it did in 1980 for labor force and
other economic data and this estimate does not even in
clude the impact of inflation. We believe that BLS Commis
sioner Janet Norwood got to the heart of the matter when
she recently said:
There is a problem with a statistical system that
stands still and doesn't do new things to keep up
with the state of the art. You are really
deteriorating, and in five years you can be a hasbeen; the whole statistical system in the United
States could be that way. 8
We agree with Commissioner Norwood that the system
faces two basic forms of deterioration. BLS already has been
forced to reduce or eliminate the industry wage survey, the
family budget survey, occupational outlook, strike statistics,
and labor turnover data. Many users of these and other labor
force data are just starting to miss these important data.
Even with massive budget reductions, BLS has been able
to maintain the basic core programs including labor force
status, prices, wages and productivity. However, sound
policies require more than mere grinding out of data. The
system will become obsolete if the analysts are not offered
opportunities to innovate and experiment. This second form
of deterioration could wind up being an even more serious
problem than the first form.
While public regard for numerous national institutions has
declined, our labor force statistics system has retained the
faith of the vast majority of Americans. The reason this in
formation system is so widely used by the government,
private industry, unions, the media and researchers is
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because it is prepared by a dedicated and highly competent
cadre of experts, and it retains a high level of public con
fidence. It has taken years of hard work and nonpartisan
dedication to build up this good will and public confidence.
If this trust is lost due either to inertia or lack of
funds then public confidence will not be easily regained.
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Policy Analysis and the
Current Population Survey Data
Leon Taub
Chase Econometrics
Introduction
The Current Population Survey (CPS) provides a wealth
of data on labor force and employment conditions within the
U.S. economy. Every month its importance is highlighted by
one of the most widely quoted U.S. economic statistics the
previous month's unemployment rate. Expansion of the
survey in terms of the number of people covered and the
number of questions asked has led to the regular publication
of detailed indices of unemployment rates by type of occupa
tion, by major industry and class of worker, by age, sex, and
race, by region and by reason of unemployment. The addi
tional information on the labor force has led to the provision
of a smorgasbord of unemployment measures based upon
varying definitions of unemployment and labor force.
As important as the monthly unemployment rate is, my
focus on it thus far may have the effect of understating the
breadth of the CPS data for statistical analysis for two im
portant reasons. First, the collection of the sample involves
the surveying of the same household for eight months, with
an additional eight month break in the middle. Thus the data
base contains a significant amount of longitudinal as well as
cross-sectional time series information. Second, the sup
plementary surveys and data, particularly the March ques23
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dons on family income, add a wealth of additional informa
tion. For these reasons, the CPS data base is one of the most
valuable data sources in the United States.

The Key Policy Questions
Each of us has his/her own mental list of key economic
policy questions. Some of the major types of questions,
presented in an order which relates to my presentation but
not meant to imply any judgment of relative importance,
are:
Macroeconomic Questions
(1) How much national income has been/is being lost due
to the incomplete utilization of labor?
(2) To what extent is "tightness" in the labor markets
adding to inflation?
Microeconomic/Programmatic Questions
(3) To what extent are labor market imperfections im
peding economic growth?
(4) To what extent do transfer payments reduce employ
ment and job search incentives?

(5) How many unemployed workers could be aided by
alternative programmatic actions?

Sub-national Data Questions
(6) What major occupation/skill classifications and
regional locations show the greatest job vacan
cy/unemployed worker imbalances?
Social/Personal Questions
(7) What are the social and personal costs of current
unemployment levels?
While this list is certainly not exhaustive, it is indicative of
the types of important policy questions which can be asked.
The first two questions lost income and inflationary
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pressures reflect the macroeconomic costs of employment
changes. The next three questions reflect microeconomic
level questions and programmatic issues. Alternative pro
grammatic actions include the traditional questions of direct
employment versus training subsidies versus trickle down
programs versus public works spending. The issue of per
sonal incentives has already become a key determinant of
policy as it affects "rich" people who once faced marginal
tax rates of 50 percent to 70 percent. Someday "supply side"
economics may be applied to the working poor who face
disincentives at rates as high as 60 percent to 100 percent
earnings. The question of labor market imperfections, which
currently seems to be out of favor as a research topic, may be
an extremely important aspect of our current economic
situation as I will note later.
The sixth question on the distribution of employment is
important because it asks whether the CPS can be an infor
mation source which would directly remove some barriers to
the efficient use of our nation's human resources. The
answer to this question also has important implications for
the optimum distribution of federal resources by type of ex
penditure and by region. The importance of the final ques
tion, which relates to the social and personal hardships faced
by Americans under current labor market conditions, is, I
hope, obvious to all.

The CPS and the
Macroeconomic Policy Issues
The value of the CPS in answering many of these critical
policy issues should not be underestimated. While we can
argue about the exact definition of many of the terms in the
survey and the alleged biases in both directions, the CPS
usually provides unambiguous answers to the two key
"macroeconomic" policy questions. Furthermore, any
limitations of the "official" key unemployment rate

26

Policy Analysis and the CPS

measure are offset by the availability of supplementary data
and the exhaustive analysis of these data which has already
been accomplished.
Any uncertainty surrounding the current state of the labor
market, as it relates to the macroeconomic issues, does not
stem from confusion on the definition of the phrase "hidden
unemployment," the phrase "looking for work," or the
labor market attachment of teenagers; rather, uncertainty
can only occur if people do not understand, or prefer to ob
fuscate, phrases such as "9.5 percent" (the current
unemployment rate), "10.5 million" (the current number of
unemployed Americans), "5.9 million," (the number of peo
ple who lost their last job) or "50 percent" (the black
teenage unemployment rate). Certainly we are utilizing our
labor force extremely ineffectively, and labor market
"tightness" is providing little, if any, inflationary pressures
on wage rates.
Some confusion relating to the macroeconomic issues may
arise when the unemployment rate is between 4 percent and 6
percent. However, even in these ranges sufficient supplemen
tary data are provided to obtain good estimates of the
macroeconomic impacts of labor force conditions. Further
more, criticisms of the CPS unemployment rate data usually
relate primarily to the definitions employed. Even if the
various proposed changes were adopted, the adjustments
would primarily affect the reported level rather than
reported changes in the unemployment rate. As is shown in
Figure 1, fluctuations in the unemployment rate are quite
similar, no matter which unemployment rate definition is
used. The macroeconomic implications, therefore, would
not be severely affected by shifting the definitions of the
"official" rate. By contrast, the problem in defining policy
usually relates to weighing the relative importance of the two
partially contradictory macroeconomic policy issues, a ques
tion which data collection cannot hope to resolve.

Figure 1. Alternative Unemployment Rate Measures
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Returning to the present situation for a moment, I would
like to pose the question: "If the answers to the
macroeconomic policy questions are perfectly obvious, why
don't we do something about the current unemployment
situation?" Four possible answers spring to mind im
mediately. First, we do not possess either the necessary
policy tools or the knowledge of how to use them. Second,
we may value even small reductions in inflation more than
income gains. Third, the CPS data may not present the
answers to these questions clearly enough for noneconomists
to understand. Fourth, we may believe the present situation
represents a temporary but necessary adjustment, which will
allow us to eventually reach a period of relative price stabili
ty and high employment levels.
Since we cannot delve into the minds of policymakers,
none of these possibilities can be dismissed out-of-hand.
However, the evidence that we can control the economy
through monetary and fiscal policies is overwhelming.
Therefore the first answer is not likely to provide the most
important explanation.
The second answer is even less likely to be the primary
driver behind current policy actions. It is well known that as
unemployment rises, the costs rise in at least a linear fashion,
while the inflation reducing impact rises at an ever
diminishing rate. Public opinion polls indicating that most
Americans are not even aware of the extent of recent infla
tion reductions, when combined with this asymmetry of
costs and benefits, must mean that 9.5 percent unemploy
ment is not the rate preferred by most Americans.
One can argue that economists have been poor in com
municating information on these policy options or the costs
of unemployment to policymakers. That view leads directly
to the third point. Perhaps current data, including the CPS
data, do not adequately address the macroeconomic policy
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issues and relationships. Certainly, by combining compensa
tion data (perhaps from the March CPS) with the monthly
regional and skill unemployment and underemployment
data, one could calculate an "income gap" measure. This
measure would address the "income lost" question more
directly. The loss in income could then be compared with
either a zero baseline or perhaps more appropriately some
arbitrary unemployment rate, or perhaps to a time when
labor market conditions for a given percentage of the
economy were defined as "tight." (While the latter measure
is of course subjective, the same criticism could be leveled as
with other commonly used indices, such as capacity utiliza
tion or the timing of NBER reference cycles.)
The same goal emphasizing the "income gap" conse
quences of high unemployment could also be addressed by
changing the definition of the "official measure" of
unemployment. Unfortunately, this would reduce the
usefulness of the data for estimating labor market induced
inflationary pressures. However, there are several reasons
for suggesting that the official measure of the unemployment
rate should concentrate on the "income gap" question
rather than the inflation question. First, most empirical
studies of the U.S. economy, including econometric models,
Phillips-curve analysis, and anecdotal reports, have found
that the relationship between unemployment and infla
tionary pressures are variable. Thus we may be giving up a
useful direct indicator of income lost for a less useful indirect
measure of inflationary pressures. Second, for unemploy
ment rates above 5 percent, which means for 10 of the last 11
years, the changes in national income from changes in the
unemployment rate are almost certainly more important
than the changes in the job market pressures on wage rates
from changes in the unemployment rate.
Third, recent evidence by Medoff and Abraham (NBER
Working Paper 781) suggests that labor market indicators
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which measure unsatisfied demand are better for measuring
the inflationary pressures in the economy than the
unemployment rate. If these indices, which include the quit
rate from the CPS, do in fact perform this function equally
well or better than the published unemployment rate, it is
clear we should use the unemployment rate to measure the
loss in income and output, and these other measures to
estimate labor market inflationary pressures.
Thus a change in the focus of the official unemployment
rate to a measure which includes workers discouraged for
economic reasons and those working part time for economic
reasons would seem to be warranted. The collection of job
vacancy data, as a supplement to the CPS would aid in
assessing of labor market inflationary pressures, and would
more than compensate for the change in focus of the official
unemployment rate.
On a more mundane level, I should note that one recurring
problem with the CPS data is the lack of reliability of the
monthly unemployment estimates. Macroeconomists often
find themselves "explaining away" the unemployment data
for a given month because of sampling and seasonality prob
lems. It may be that some policymakers, after hearing that
"this month's data are poor" too many times, begin to
believe the data set itself is useless. A larger sample would
help to remedy these problems. An even more important,
and less costly, improvement would be to stagger the CPS
surveys during the month. This would reduce the number of
distortions which arise as a result of extremely poor weather
in a given week during the winter, the variability of school
recesses in the spring, and the randomness of holidays
throughout the year. In essence, the unemployment rate
would be a true monthly series instead of a weekly series
gathered only 12 times a year.
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Why Does the Current Recession Exist?
Returning to the dilemma posed earlier, perhaps current
employment rates are tolerated, not because we lack the
knowledge to do better, but rather because there is a belief
that it is necessary to endure an admittedly painful but
presumably temporary adjustment period to arrive at condi
tions which will be substantially better in the future. This ex
planation, I believe, should not be denigrated as either im
plausible or as stemming from "latent Puritanism." First, I
have run out of alternative hypotheses. Second, this ra
tionale is often cited by policymakers when describing the
current situation. Third, I believe there is some evidence that
the current recession is having a significant impact upon
American society in a way which augers well for the long-run
health of the nation.
The data I am referring to are, for the most part, scattered
and anecdotal. It may be that when collected and evaluated
they would be found insignificant. However, we have all
heard the charge that recessions are "necessary" to remove
excessive expectations from the system. It is hardly radical to
suggest that this view should be the subject of investigation.
Indeed, it does appear that the current economic environ
ment is substantially reducing expectations of income gains
in some sales. For example, until recently, it appeared that a
serious and growing imbalance was developing between the
compensation rates of workers in some industries, primarily
those with industrywide collective bargaining agreements,
and those of other workers. Casual empiricism would sug
gest that the current recession is rectifying some of these im
balances. Furthermore, it may be that a less severe recession,
even if coupled with the same import problems, would not
have served this end.
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The current recession has clearly lowered the expectations
of most Americans in terms of expected standard of living
increases. If these lowered expectations persist even after the
economy begins to recover, it will be much easier for the
economy to satisfy these expectations without inflation.
Presumably this means less inflation through a "better"
(i.e., lower) rate of consumption (assuming the validity of
the permanent income hypothesis). It also may mean lower
demands for transfer payments and hence lower taxes, and
increased incentives for low income workers to stay in the
labor force and accept low paying jobs and lower minimum
wage gains.
A third example seems evident when one talks to business
leaders who appear to be placing renewed emphasis on curb
ing inventories, cutting overhead staffs, increasing line
worker productivity, and improving quality control. Until
last year, productivity growth seemed to be a national goal
rather than a business imperative. However, the preliminary
GNP and employment data indicate that productivity, using
the BLS measure, rose last quarter despite a falling GNP.
The last time that occurred was in the fourth quarter of 1957.
Certainly one quarter's data can always reflect a coin
cidence. Many more months of data will be needed before a
structural trend could clearly be discerned. Nevertheless, it
may be that a profit squeeze as disasterous as the squeeze ex
perienced in recent months was necessary, given the structure
of our economy, to restore productivity growth to an
elevated role in American business decisions.
Perhaps these reorientations of expectations and goals
would have occurred without a recession as serious as the
one we are experiencing. Perhaps the changed views of the
world will fail to persist. Perhaps the change is quantitatively
unimportant. However, in the current evidence vacuum it is
difficult to counter the charge that recessions are useful in
this regard.
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The Key Microeconomic Policy Issues
The purpose of presenting this hypothesis, or perhaps
more correctly, this series of conjectures, is not to argue that
pain can be good for you even if one does feel better when
it stops. Rather it is to suggest that some of the major
economic problems in the United States may be
microeconomic rather than macroeconomic in nature. (This
may seem like an unusual position for a macroeconomist to
take. However, I remind you that it is common for members
of the Fed to discuss fiscal policy leaving the monetary
policy discussions for the Congress.)
In a situation in which competitive markets exist, one
should not need severe recessions to change expectations and
restore primacy to questions of marginal cost and marginal
productivity. For example, in a competitive environment, it
would not be necessary to destroy or seriously weaken every
company in an industry, or every worker in an industry, in
order to convince them to act efficiently. The market should
"discipline" companies and individuals who fail to follow
these precepts one at a time.
This line of thought suggests that the key to solving our
current economic problems and to avoiding severe recessions
in the future (other than those stemming from energy
"shocks," from crises, or from past policy errors) does not
require only that we be better informed on the
macroeconomic causes and consequences of policy actions;
rather it requires us also to look at some microeconomic data
and microeconomic solutions. While the CPS appears to be
designed primarily to explore macroeconomic issues, it may
be that the CPS data can be helpful in providing information
on the microeconomic issues as well. If so, it will require
great ingenuity by researchers in blending the CPS data with
full longitudinal and other microeconomic data bases. Fur
thermore, there may be areas in which it is extremely impor-
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tant to add to the current CPS survey, either on an annual or
on a more frequent basis.
The types of microeconomic questions which could use
more study include: (1) the extent to which industrywide col
lective bargaining has provided monopoly gains to workers
in those industries and consequent losses to others; (2) the
extent to which transfer payments affect work disincentives
(for example, combining the results of the Seattle-Denver ex
periment, particularly comparing the differences in the
three-year and the five-year program impacts with CPSbased data on the impact of unemployment compensation
differences); and (3) the magnitude and types of barriers to
employees changing their occupation and/or place of
residence. These questions and other microeconomicoriented questions are important not just because they would
improve our understanding of the economy and help devise
specific programs which would benefit many potential
workers. The answers to these questions might also lead to
direct program actions which would not only immediately
improve the performance of the economy on a
macroeconomic basis, but might also obviate the rationale
for putting the economy through recessionary conditions as
severe as those we are presently experiencing.
I recognize the limitations of the CPS as a microeconomic
data source. Examples are: (1) followup after 16 months is
nonexistent; (2) the following of workers to other locations
is not attempted; (3) the sample size is too small for many
cross-sectional applications. This argues for supplementing
the data where possible from other studies, providing results
which are admittedly preliminary and tentative, and for try
ing to convince the government to improve the data base.
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The CPS and Occupation/Skill
and Regional Data
In the area of data collection, the recession and govern
ment policies have certainly caused economists to experience
the phenomenon of "lowered expectations." However the
cost of data collection is hardly a legitimate objection when
economic policies are based upon the data. If
microeconomic policies could be used to accomplish goals
presently accomplished with macroeconomic policy, the net
average increase in GNP and federal revenues would be in
the billions. Collecting data is clearly cheaper than executing
policies in ignorance.
Without belaboring the point, it is clear that additional
data on occupation and skill classifications, on regional
employment conditions and on demographic detail would be
useful to policymakers. The need for a consistent com
parable job vacancy index was noted earlier. Its usefulness
on a regional level would be even greater than on a national
level. When critical policy decisions on the state, local and
federal levels are based upon poor information, or when
billions of dollars in federal funds are distributed suboptimally because proper data do not exist, or when executive
offices spend millions to "create" labor force estimates
because the primary data are unreliable or nonexistent, no
one gains. Information is a public good. If we underproduce
it, we all suffer.

The Social/Personal Costs
of Labor Conditions
As I noted in the beginning, the ordering of the policy
questions was designed for expositional ease rather than to
denote importance. Indeed, the last issue, the social/per
sonal costs of unemployment, is perhaps the most important
of all. I have saved it for last because I believe the CPS can
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be utilized as a source of information on this issue only if a
major amount of specific supplementary data are gathered.
Certainly the CPS provides a crude but useful measure of
the costs of unemployment. If the official measure of the
unemployment rates is modified as I suggested earlier to
reflect the "income gap" aspect of unemployment, the
social/personal costs of unemployment would be shown
even more dramatically. However, this measurement of
these costs is far from precise. Unemployment compensation
reduces the costs of short-run unemployment; but how can
this be quantified? A simple measure like the unemployment
rate will not even capture the direction of change in
social/personal costs which result when benefits are increas
ed. Clearly unemployment in a one-worker family is more
serious than the unemployment of one worker in a multiworker family; but how much? Clearly, full-time employ
ment in an occupation which uses a worker's abilities only
partially is a cost; but how is the concept to be defined?
These costs are both cyclical and secular. Secular costs are
even more difficult to define than cyclical costs. "Poverty"
in the United States is defined using income levels which
would denote affluence in other nations. Indeed, to the ex
tent that "poverty" is relative, winning the war on
"poverty" can be accomplished only by equalizing all in
comes. Indeed, the definition of secular social/personal
costs is, I believe, impossible.
If we accept the concept of costs in a cyclical rather than a
secular framework, it may be possible to quantify the
social/personal costs of a given level of economic perfor
mance. My suggestion for accomplishing this goal is to
measure changes in consumption patterns rather than
changes in income patterns. One could, using surveys,
measure the changes in the consumption behavior of in
dividuals. Shifts in consumption patterns away from "lux-
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uries" toward "necessities" would represent personal
distress. The changes associated with unemployment would
therefore be included in this measure. In addition, other
causes of hardship would also be included. A forced wage
cut, the absence of overtime or of full-time employment,
underemployment, or an oil price "shock" may all lead to
personal costs which would be reflected in a consumption
based index.
This approach would have several additional advantages.
It solves the problem of newly unemployed workers facing
different levels of distress as a result of different asset
holdings. It also solves the problem of adjusting the distress
of unemployment for the existence of income replacement
programs in any particular year. Finally it also enables one
to deal with people's ability to change their style of social
organization in response to unemployment changes. (If a
teenager loses his/her job, he/she may be forced to move
back with his/her parents. The teenager may be distressed,
but the consumption pattern may indicate a minimal social
cost.)
The concept, as I have presented it, is obviously extremely
rough. Not only have I made no effort to refine it, but the ef
forts would have been unsuccessful even if I had. Years of
gathering primary data, trying to construct an index, and
finally observing the index would be required to develop a
good measure of personal social distress. However, I do
believe that such an indicator is presently lacking and its ad
dition to our list of economic indicators would substantially
add to our understanding of the economy, thereby leading to
better policy decisions. Without the addition of
consumption-oriented data, it may not be possible to create a
satisfactory index of the personal costs of unemployment.
Unfortunately, the costs of gathering these data and per
forming the theoretical and empirical work necessary to con-
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struct an index are not small. The decision on whether or not
to proceed will not be easy. However, it seems to make little
sense to debate social program changes involving billions of
dollars in a vacuum because the data necessary to evaluate
the social/personal impacts have simply not been collected.

Conclusions
Four types of key policy questions which relate to the CPS
have been identified. With respect to the first type the
macroeconomic questions several suggestions have been
presented. First, the focus of the official measure of
unemployment should be shifted from industry labor market
tightness to quantifying the loss in national income due to
unemployment. This could be accomplished either by con
structing a direct income gap measure, or by including
workers who are either discouraged or working part time for
economic reasons in the official unemployment measure. A
job vacancy index, or existing CPS data such as the "quit
rate" should be used to measure the inflationary pressures
resulting from labor market conditions. Second, the amount
of monthly randomness of the data should be improved by
staggering the survey weeks to create a true monthly (rather
than recurring weekly) unemployment index. Expanding the
sample would also help in this regard.
The second type of question the microeconomic/programmatic questions is often viewed as relating
to narrow issues. This view may well be incorrect. Indeed,
our failure to deal successfully with the microeconomic inef
ficiencies in our economy may be a major factor leading to
our present sub-par macroeconomic performance. Although
the CPS is not well-equipped to deal with these issues by
itself, it can make a major contribution to our understanding
of these issues if combined with longitudinal, experimental,
and other supplemental data.
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With respect to the sub-national data questions, both the
usefulness and the deficiencies of the CPS are well-known.
Extra data gathering efforts in this area would, I believe, be
extremely cost efficient in terms of improving our economic
performance, improving the effectiveness of federal, state
and local policy decisions, and better targeting federal
spending programs. In addition to expanding the sample, a
separate effort to collect job vacancy indices as a supplement
to the CPS data would be helpful.
The final type of question the personal/social costs of
labor conditions is extremely difficult to answer. In order
to address these questions properly, I believe it may be
necessary to restrict the question to cyclic rather than long
term costs. Even so, it is probably necessary to supplement
the CPS data with consumption-oriented survey data and a
new index based upon changes in family consumption pat
terns. Thus the costs of collecting the data and constructing
the index will be high. However, the value of the additional
information is also likely to be great.

4
The Hardship Consequences
of Labor Market Problems*
Robert Taggart
Youth Knowledge Development Project
Who Really Suffers?
How many really suffer as a result of labor market prob
lems? This is one of the most critical yet contentious social
policy questions. In many ways, our social statistics exag
gerate the degree of hardship. Unemployment does not have
the same dire consequences today as it did in the 1930s when
most of the unemployed were primary breadwinners, when
income and earnings were usually much closer to the margin
of subsistence, and when there was no safety net for those
failing in the labor market. Increasing affluence, the rise of
multiple-earner families, the growing predominance of
secondary earners among the unemployed, and improved
social welfare protections, have unquestionably mitigated
the welfare consequences of joblessness. Earnings and in
come data also overstate the dimensions of hardship. Among
the millions with hourly earnings at or below the minimum
wage level, the overwhelming majority are from multipleearner, relatively affluent families. Most of those counted by
the poverty statistics are elderly, handicapped or have family
responsibilities which keep them out of the labor force, so
the poverty statistics are by no means an accurate indicator
"This paper was adapted from Hardship (Kalamazoo, MI: The W. E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research, 1982).
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of labor market failure. Moreover, in-kind benefits which
reduce cash needs are not considered in the poverty
measures.
Yet there are also many ways our social statistics
underestimate the degree of labor market-related hardship.
The unemployment counts exclude the millions of fully
employed workers whose wages are so low that their families
remain in poverty. Low wages and repeated or prolonged
unemployment frequently interact to undermine the capacity
for self-support; since the number experiencing joblessness
at some point during the year is several times the average an
nual unemployed, the number who suffer as a consequence
of forced idleness can equal or exceed the monthly
unemployment levels even though only a minority of those
unemployed in any month really suffer. For every person
counted in the monthly unemployment tallies, there is
another working part time because of the inability to find
full time work, or else outside the labor force but wanting a
job. Finally, income transfers in our country have always
focused on the elderly, disabled and dependent, neglecting
the needs of the working poor, so that the dramatic expan
sion of cash and in-kind transfers has not necessarily
alleviated labor market-related hardship.
Mountains of facts, figures and learned treatises have been
marshalled to prove that the truly needy are few and far be
tween. An equally imposing volume of contradicting
evidence documents uncounted and unmet basic needs. The
result is confusion. It is uncertain and bitterly disputed
whether those suffering seriously as a result of labor market
problems number in the hundreds of thousands or the tens of
millions, and, hence, whether high levels of joblessness can
be easily tolerated or must be countered by job creation and
economic stimulus, whether the safety net needs dismantling
or strengthening, and whether the long term hardship trends
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justify a "laissez faire" response or demand fundamental
restructuring of labor markets and the income distribution
system. There is only one area of agreement in this
debate that the existing poverty, employment and earnings
statistics are inadequate for one of their primary applica
tions: measuring the welfare consequences of labor market
problems.
Thus, the hardship measurement system was developed to
determine who really suffers as a result of joblessness, low
earnings and involuntary part-time employment. Available
employment, earnings and poverty data are structured into a
set of core indicators which incorporate alternative need and
workforce attachment standards, which assess the severity of
problems as well as the numbers affected, which consider
earnings from both an individual and family perspective, as
well as considering supplementary income including in-kind
aid. The aggregate measures, in turn, are disaggregated to
identify the relative hardship burdens for different popula
tion segments and to learn more about the causes and cures
for hardship.

The Dimensions of Hardship
The Basic Indicators
The hardship measures are designed to address six basic
questions:
Inadequate Individual Earnings (HE) - How many
persons who participate in the workforce during the
year are unable to earn at least the minimum wage
equivalent for their total hours of work availability?
HE Deficit - What additional earnings are needed to
raise the wages and salaries of these individuals with
inadequate earnings to the minimum wage level?
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Inadequate Family Earnings (IFE) - How many
workforce participants are in families whose total
wages and salaries are below the poverty level?
IFE Deficit - For workforce participants with Inade
quate Family Earnings, what is the shortfall between
family earnings and poverty thresholds?
Inadequate Family Income (IFI) - How many
workforce participants have family incomes below the
poverty level?
IFI Deficit - How many dollars of added earnings or
other income are needed to raise the families of
workforce participants in the IFI out of poverty?
Based on the work experience, income, earnings and other
information collected in the March Current Population
Survey covering the preceding calendar year, these questions
can be answered for each year since 1974, with the latest
available data covering 1980. The derivation and dimensions
of hardship are best illustrated using 1979 as a baseline, since
this was the last year when the economy was reasonably
healthy:
1. Inadequate Individual Earnings (HE). During 1979,
seven of every ten persons age 16 and over worked or
looked for work in the civilian labor market. Among
these 117.0 million participants, one of every four, or
28.3 million, had annual earnings less than the amount
each would have earned if paid the minimum wage for
all hours they were willing and able to work during the
year (Chart 1).
2. HE Deficit. To raise the earnings, of these individuals
up to the minimum wage equivalent for their hours of
availability would have required $52.0 billion in addi
tional earnings, which represented 4.0 percent of the
nation's total wages and salaries. The average worker

Chart 1
Persons in Severe Hardship, 1979

(Millions)
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in the HE needed $1,839 in added annual earnings to
reach the minimum wage equivalent.
3. Inadequate Family Earnings (IFE). Not all these in
dividuals were economically deprived as a result of
their earnings shortfalls, while others, who themselves
earned at least the minimum wage equivalent, never
theless lacked the annual family earnings required to
escape poverty either because of their own limited
hours of availability for work, their large families, or
the lack of supplementary family earners. Two-thirds
of the 28.3 million persons with Inadequate Individual
Earnings lived in families with combined earnings
above the poverty level, leaving only 9.1 million in
families unable to achieve minimal self-support by the
work of family members. On the other hand, there
were 4.2 million workforce participants with adequate
individual earnings relative to their hours of availabili
ty who were in families with below-poverty earnings.
These 13.3 million workforce participants with Inade
quate Family Earnings represented 11.4 percent of the
total workforce.
4. IFE Deficit. Workforce participants with Inadequate
Family Earnings needed an additional $31.7 billion in
wages and salaries to raise their families' earnings to
the poverty level. This IFE Deficit represented 2.4 per
cent of the nation's total wages and salaries and
averaged $2,384 for each workforce member in the IFE
count.
5. Inadequate Family Income (IFI). Of the 13.3 million in
the IFE, 2.8 million were in families lifted out of
poverty by the receipt of private pensions, alimony, in
terest and other nontransfer income. Cash transfers
such as welfare and social security, raised an additional
3.4 million above the poverty threshold. Thus, just
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over half of the individuals with Inadequate Family
Earnings also had Inadequate Family Income. This 7.1
million in the IFI represented 6.0 percent of the
workforce and two-fifths of the poor age 16 and over.
6. IFI Deficit. Transfers and other sources of income
reduced the $31.7 billion IFE Deficit by almost threefifths. The $12.8 billion IFI Deficit for poor families
with members in the workforce represented over half
of the nation's total poverty deficit. To alleviate pover
ty among the working poor would have required an ad
ditional $1,818 in earnings supplements for each
workforce participant with Inadequate Family In
come.

Hardship and Workforce Attachment
These measures of severe hardship counted all individuals
participating in the workforce during 1979, including some
holding or looking for part-time jobs so that they were
available for work just a few hours over the year, but others
in the labor force full-time, year-round. Although seven of
every ten workforce participants in 1979 worked or looked
for work at least 50 weeks, only half of those with Inade
quate Individual Earnings were available full-year (Chart 2).
Among the workforce participants in the IFE and IFI, only
three-fifths participated for half a year or more and just twofifths were full-year participants.
Increased workforce attachment reduced the probability
of economic hardship (Chart 3). The rates of Inadequate
Family Earnings and Inadequate Family Income among par
ticipants in the workforce less than half the year were more
than four times the rates among full-year participants. Ob
viously, families with full-year participants had more hours
of potential employment and were, therefore, more likely to
have family earnings above the poverty level. Yet the in-
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Chart!
Severe Hardship Counts by Work Force Attachment During 1979

WORK FORCE (000)

JTotal = 116,983
J Half-Year = 98,733
J Full-Year = 83,979

INADEQUATE INDIVIDUAL EARNINGS
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Half-Year HE = 19,299 = 19.5% Half-Year Work Force
16.5% Total Work Force
Full-Year HE = 14,248 = 17.0% Full-Year Work Force
12.2% Total Work Force

INADEQUATE FAMILY EARNINGS
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I Full-Year IFE = 5,675 = 6.8% Full-Year Work Force
4.9% Total Work Force
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J
INADEQUATE FAMILY INCOME
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2.6% Total Work Force
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Chart 3
Incidence of Hardship by Work Force Attachment, 1979
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cidence of Inadequate Individual Earnings among less than
half-year participants was also greater than among full-year
participants, even though the adequacy of each person's
yearly earnings was judged relative to his or her estimated
annual hours in the workforce.

Alternative Adequacy Standards
The attainment of minimum wage earnings for individuals
and poverty threshold earnings for families is hardly a cause
for rejoicing. For an urban family of four, the lowest-level
food menu of the Department of Agriculture, dinner out at a
low-priced restaurant once every two months, minimally
adequate rental housing, no out-of-town trips, auto owner
ship by just half of families, a movie for the children once a
month, no cigarettes, and a six pack of beer three times a
month for the family, would have cost an estimated $12,000
in Autumn 1979. The 1979 poverty level for a nonfarm fami
ly of four represented less than three-fifths of this BLS lower
living standard. If one parent worked full time and the other
worked part time at the $2.90 minimum wage in 1979, their
combined family earnings would have been less than threefourths of the standard; and even if both earned 150 percent
of the minimum wage, they would have just achieved the
lower living standard.
The use of less severe earnings and income standards in
creases the hardship counts and related deficits (Chart 4).
Calculating the HE on the basis of 125 percent, rather than
100 percent, of the minimum wage for all hours of availabili
ty, raises the HE tally among total workforce participants by
45 percent; while comparing family earnings and incomes to
125 percent rather than 100 percent of the poverty level raises
the IFE count by 30 percent and the IFI count by nearly half.
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Chart 4
Hardship Among 1979 Work Force Participants
Under Alternative Adequacy Standards

(Numbers In Thousands)

TOTAL WORK FORCE • 116.983
J MODERATE HARDSHIP STANDARDS • 51.436 « 44.01 Work Force
INADEQUATE
INDIVIDUAL
EARNINGS

] INTERMEDIATE HARDSHIP STANDARDS - 40,961 • 35.0* Work Force
~] SEVERE HARDSHIP STANDARDS - 28,269 • 24.2* Work Force

3 MODERATE HARDSHIP STANDARDS = 21,553 « 18.4* Work Force
INADEQUATE
FAMILY
EARNINGS

J INTERMEDIATE HARDSHIP STANDARDS • 17,190 » 14.7* Work Force
SEVERE HARDSHIP STANDARDS • 13,280 • 11.4* Work Force

MODERATE HARDSHIP STANDARDS « 14,354 = 12.3* Work Force
INTERMEDIATE HARDSHIP STANDARDS = 10,524 = 9.0* Work Force
SEVERE HARDSHIP STANDARDS = 7,055 = 6.0* Work Force

Severe Hardship Standard:

ME earnings standard 100 percent of minimum
wage and IFE family earnings and IFI family
Income standard 100 percent of poverty

Intermediate Hardship Standard:

HE earnings standard 125 percent of minimum
wage and IFE family earnings and IFI family
Income standard 125 percent of poverty

Moderate Hardship Standard:

ME earnings standard 150 percent of minimum
wage and IFE family earnings and IFI family
Income standard 150 percent of poverty
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What Causes Hardship
Labor Market Pathologies
The unemployment rate is our nation's most carefully
scrutinized and widely quoted social indicator, to a large ex
tent because of the presumed association between joblessness
and economic deprivation. Each week of forced idleness
reduces annual earnings and increases the chances that in
dividual and family earnings will be inadequate. Almost all
of the 1979 workforce participants who were unemployed or
discouraged for two-thirds or more of their weeks in the
labor market had annual earnings below the minimum wage
level for their yearly hours of availability (Chart 5). Yet
among those unemployed less than a third of their weeks in
the labor force, two of every three had at least minimally
adequate individual earnings over the year. Since this group
with shorter duration unemployment represented three-fifths
of those experiencing unemployment, only half of all the
unemployed had Inadequate Individual Earnings, among
whom three of every five resided in families with combined
earnings above the poverty level. Just one of every seven
workforce participants who experienced unemployment dur
ing the year resided in a poor family.
Workforce participants who experienced unemploy
ment (000)
- Unemployed with adequate individual earnings

18,468
-8,591

= Unemployed in HE
- Unemployed with Inadequate Individual Earnings
but family earnings above poverty level
+ Unemployed with adequate individual earnings
but Inadequate Family Earnings

9,877
-6,169

= Unemployed in IFE

4,210

+502
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- Unemployed in IFE lifted out of poverty by nontransfer income
- Unemployed in IFE lifted out of poverty by cash
transfers

-1,044

= Unemployed in IFI

2,618
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Thus, unemployment and economic hardship were hardly
synonymous. Over half of those who experienced unemploy
ment during 1979 resided in families with incomes above
$15,000, or just below the median family income level, com
pared with only 6 percent of labor force participants includ
ed in the IFE count, and virtually none of those included in
the IFI count (Chart 6).
Low hourly earnings and limited hours of employment,
rather than unemployment, were the major causes of hard
ship. Two-thirds of the 28.3 million workforce participants
with Inadequate Individual Earnings, and a similar propor
tion of the 13.3 million with Inadequate Family Earnings,
experienced no unemployment during the year. There were
6.4 million low-paid workers who were employed full time
during all weeks of participation yet did not earn the
minimum wage equivalent for their hours of availability.
Likewise, one of three persons with Inadequate Family Earn
ings, and a fourth of these with Inadequate Family Income,
had full-time jobs during all their weeks in the workforce.
Thirty-five percent of part-time workers who were employed
all weeks of participation did not earn the minimum wage
equivalent for their hours of availability, and they accounted
for over two-fifths of the persons with less than minimum
wage earnings.
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Distribution of workforce
and severe hardship counts
for total workforce
by work experience pattern
Work
force
HE
IFE
IFI
55.0% 22.7% 22.0% 24.8%

Employed full time all weeks
Employed part time voluntarily some
or all weeks, no unemployment
23.1
Employed part time involuntarily,
some or all weeks
6.1
Unemployed one-third or fewer
weeks in workforce
9.4
Unemployed one-third to two-thirds
weeks in workforce
3.3
Unemployed over two-thirds of weeks
in workforce but with some
employment
1.4
Not employed
1.7
Total

100.0

31.1

35.6

26.6

11.3

10.7

11.6

13.0

11.3

13.3

9.5

8.3

8.9

5.4
7.0

5.1
7.0

6.0
8.9

100.0

100.0

100.0
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Severe Hardship Incidence Rates Among Individuals with Differing Patterns of Work Experience During 1979
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Breadwinners and Breadwinning
Responsibilities
Because needs increase with family size, the welfare conse
quences of low individual earnings are more serious for
breadwinners who must support large families. Where there
are many mouths to feed, minimum wage equivalent earn
ings are not a passport out of poverty even with full time,
full-year employment. But many breadwinners with
numerous dependents also have limited annual hours of
work availability and of actual employment.
Among the 13.3 million workforce participants with
below-poverty family earnings in 1979, and the 5.7 million in
the full-year IFE, 4.2 million and 1.2 million, respectively,
earned above the minimum wage equivalent for their annual
hours of availability. Conversely, among the 28.7 million
total workforce participants, and 14.2 million full-year par
ticipants, with Inadequate Individual Earnings in 1979, only
9.1 and 4.5 million, respectively, were in families with belowpoverty earnings.
The probabilities that persons with Inadequate Individual
Earnings will be members of families with below-poverty
earnings, or that family earnings will be inadequate despite
adequate individual earnings, increase with the number of
dependents per worker. For instance, the IFE incidence
among workers in families with two workforce participants
were as follows:
Incidence of
Inadequate Family
Earnings
among workers
with Inadequate
Individual Earnings
Two in family
Three in family
Four or five in family
Six or more in family

18.9%
17.9
26.7
46.9

Incidence of
Inadequate Family
Earnings
among workers
with Adequate
Individual Earnings
1.4%
1.2
2.3
9.3
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The likelihood of Inadequate Family Earnings declines
when there are more breadwinners in a family and when they
have greater labor force attachment. As an example, 1979
workforce participants from families with four or five
members had the following IFE rates:
Incidence of
Inadequate Family
Earnings
among workers
in families
with four or
five members
Three or more full-year participants in family
Three or more in workforce at least one week

1.6%
3.0

Two full-year participants
Two in workforce at least one week
One full-year participant
One in workforce at least one week

5.5
8.6
12.3
20.5

Work and Welfare Overlap
Income transfers mitigate the welfare consequences of
labor market problems, but many workers and their
families, including millions with substantial workforce par
ticipation, fall through the safety net. In-kind aid provides
some relief, but adding the estimated value of in-kind food
and housing aid only modestly reduces the number of
workforce participants in poverty.
Of the 13.3 million workers in families with earnings
below the poverty level in 1979, 2.8 million were lifted above
the poverty line by nontransfer earnings supplements such as
private pensions, alimony, dividends and interest. Cash
transfers then lifted a third of the remaining 10.5 million out
of poverty. Adding the value of food stamps to the cash in
comes of recipient families reduced the working poor by

Chart 6
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another 0.5 million, while adding the value of free school
lunches and housing subsidies reduced the total an additional
0.3 million. In other words, poverty among workforce par
ticipants was reduced a third by cash transfers, while cash
and in-kind transfers (excluding health care) reduced the
number of working poor by two-fifths. Cash assistance
reduced the IFI Deficit by $11.2 billion, or almost half, and
if food stamps, school lunches and housing benefits received
by the working poor were "cashed out," their poverty deficit
would have been cut by an additional $2.4 billion.
Hardship Counts

Hardship Deficits
(000)

Workforce participants in
families with below poverty
earnings (IFE)
-Lifted out of poverty by nontransfer earnings supplements

13,280
-2,823

= Workforce participants
10,457
who would be poor without transfers (IFI
Net-ofTransfers)

($000)

Family earnings deficit of
workforce participants in
families with below poverty
earnings (IFE Deficit)

$31,656

-Reduction in family earnings
deficit resulting from nontransfer earnings supplements

-7,650

= Poverty deficit of families
with workforce participants if
cash transfers excluded (IFI
Net-of-Transfer Deficit)

24,006

-Lifted out of poverty by cash
transfers

-3,402

= Work force participants in
poverty (IFI)

7,055

-Lifted out of poverty by ad
dition of value of food stamps
to cash income

= Poverty deficit of families
with workforce participants
(IFI Deficit)

-533

-Reduction in poverty deficit
if food stamps counted as cash
income

-1,916

-Further reduction in poverty
deficit if value of housing sub
sidies and school lunches added
to cash income and food
stamps

-530

-Lifted out of poverty by ad
dition of value of housing sub
sidies and school lunches to
cash income and food stamps
= Work force participants in
poverty counting in-kind aid as
income (IFI Including In-Kind
Aid)

-281
6,241

-Reduction in poverty deficit
resulting from cash transfers

= Poverty deficit of families
with workforce participants
when in-kind aid value includ
ed with cash income (IFI In
cluding In-Kind Aid Deficit)

-11,181
12,825

10,379
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The Burdens of Hardship
Hardship, like unemployment, is most likely to affect
women, minorities, younger and older workforce par
ticipants, persons with limited education, workers in bluecollar and service jobs, and residents of nommetropolitan
areas and large central cities. As a general rule, the burdens
of hardship are even more maldistributed than the burdens
of unemployment.

Sex
The incidence of unemployment among female workforce
participants was only slightly above that for males. In con
trast, females were 1.4 times as likely as males to have Inade
quate Family Earnings and Inadequate Family Income,
while the incidence of Inadequate Individual Earnings was
1.9 times higher among women than among men. Though
males were much more often primary breadwinners, the sex
differentials in hardship rates were substantial, and far
greater than the differentials in unemployment rates, for
males and females with similar support responsibilities.

Males
Females
Males family heads
(No wife in
workforce)
Female family
heads

Average
annual
unemploy
ment
5.1%

Experienced
some
unemploy
ment during
year

HE

IFE
IFI
17.5% 9.1% 5.2%

6.8

15.5<!7o
16.1

32.4

13.4

7.1

3.4

9.8

9.7

13.8

6.2

5.2

20.4

29.8

33.4

22.0
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Race
Black workforce participants were 1.7 times more likely
than whites to experience unemployment during the year,
and they were 1.5 times as likely to have Inadequate In
dividual Earnings. But the black IFE was 2.5 times that of
whites, while blacks were 3.4 times as likely to have Inade
quate Family Incomes. Similarly, Hispanics were half again
as likely as whites to experience unemployment, but the IFI
incidence among Hispanics was 2.4 times that among whites.

Whites
Blacks
Hispanics

Average
annual
unemployment
5.1%
12.2
8.3

Experienced
some
unemployment during
year
14.7%
24.2
22.0

HE
IFE
IFI
22.9% 9.8% 4.8%
34.6
24.1
16.4
28.5
16.0
15.5

Age
The incidence of Inadequate Individual Earnings was
twice as high among workforce participants age 65 and over
as among those age 25 to 44, and the incidence of Inadequate
Family Earnings among older workers was 5.4 times that
among prime age workers, although income transfers
equalized the IFI rates. Teenagers were three and a half times
as likely as prime age workers to have Inadequate Individual
Earnings.

Hardship of Labor Market Problems

16-19
20-24
25-44
45-64
65 and over

Average
annual
unemploy
ment
16.1%
9.0
4.5
3.1
3.4

Experienced
some
unemploy
ment during
year
26.5%
25.5
14.9
9.1
5.8

HE

IFE
59.4% 15.2%
12.7
30.8
8.4
16.9
17.5
9.2
45.1
35.7
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IFI
9.2%
8.0
5.7
4.2
4.3

Education
The incidence of hardship declined significantly with in
creased educational attainment. High school dropouts were
2.6 times more likely than college graduates to experience
unemployment during the year, but the HE, IFE and IFI
rates for dropouts were, respectively, 3.7, 4.3 and 5.5 times
those for college graduates.
Highest
educational
attainment
Students
Dropouts
High school graduates,
no further education
Post-secondary education
(1-3 years)
College graduates

Experienced
some
unemployment
during year
20.3%
22.0

IFI
IFE
HE
54.7% 16.2% 8.0%
12.1
21.5
34.6

15.9

21.3

8.9

4.7

13.0
8.5

16.2
9.4

7.6
4.9

3.8
2.2
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Occupation
The incidence of unemployment among operatives,
laborers, farm and service workers was 2.8 times the in
cidence among professional, technical, managerial and ad
ministrative workers, but the HE, IFE and IFI rates were
3.4, 2.9 and 3.5 times as high.

Average
annual
unemploy
ment
Professional,
technical and
managerial
Sales
Clerical
Craft and kindred
Operatives
Laborers
Farm workers
Service workers

2.3%
3.9
4.6
4.5
7.7
10.8
3.8
7.1

Experienced
some
unemploy
ment during
year
7.1%
10.8
12.1
17.3
22.0
27.4
11.0
16.8

HE

IFE

10.2%
29.4
21.3
11.5
19.6
35.2
58.4
44.8

5.6% 2.6%
10.8
4.4
8.5
4.4
7.5
4.3
10.1
5.6
9.7
16.6
25.7
15.7
20.2
10.9

IFI

Location
Workforce participants residing in nonmetropolitan areas
had the same probability of experiencing unemployment as
those in metropolitan areas, but their chances of having In
adequate Individual Earnings were two-fifths higher, while
the rates of Inadequate Family Earnings and Inadequate
Family Income were half again those of metropolitan-area
workers. The unemployment incidence in central cities of
SMSA's with over one million population was 1.3 times the
incidence in surrounding suburbs; the large central city IFE
and IFI rates were 1.8 and 2.3 times those of suburban areas.
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Average
annual
unemploy
ment
5.8%
Metropolitan areas
7.1
Central cities
5.0
Suburbs
Nonmetropolitan
5.7
areas

Experienced
some
unemploy
ment during
year
15.7%
17.6
14.3
15.7
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Severe
hardship incidence
IFE
HE
21.4% 10.1%
13.1
23.0
8.1
20.1
29.8

13.9

IFI
5.4%
7.7
4.0
7.3

Hardship Trends
The 1974-1980 Shifts
The incidence of Inadequate Individual Earnings declined
noticeably over the 1974-1980 period; the incidence of Inade
quate Family Earnings declined modestly, while the in
cidence of Inadequate Family Income actually increased.
Comparisons between the low unemployment years, 1974
and 1979, and the high unemployment years, 1975 and 1980,
are the best indicators of these multi-year trends. The severe
hardship HE dropped by 1.6 percentage points between 1974
and 1979, and 1.4 percentage points between 1975 and 1980.
The IFE rate fell by 0.2 percentage points in the first period
and 0.4 percentage points in the second. The IFI rose by 0.5
percentage points between 1975 and 1980.
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1980

19801975

19801974

-1.6%
-0.2
-0.1

29.1%
13.2
6.9

27.7%
12.8
7.2

-1.4%
-0.4
+ 0.3

+ 1.9%
+ 1.2
+ 1.1

35.0
14.7
9.0

-0.3
-0.2
-0.2

38.4
16.8
10.3

37.9
16.4
10.4

-0.5
-0.4
+ 0.1

+ 2.6
+ 1.5
+ 1.2

44.0
18.4
12.3

-0.3
-0.1
-0.5

46.6
20.9
14.3

47.3
20.5
14.1

+ 0.7
-0.4
-0.3

+ 3.0
+ 2.0
+ 1.3

1979

25.8%
11.6
6.1

24.2%
11.4
6.0

IFE
IFI

35.3
14.9
9.2

Moderate
Hardship
HE
IFE
IFI

44.3
18.5
12.8

Severe Hardship
HE
IFE
IFI
Intermediate
Hardship

HE

19791974

1975

1974

The moderate and intermediate hardship HE and IFE
totals increased relative to the severe hardship totals, while
the moderate and intermediate hardship IFI totals declined
relative to the severe hardship IFI. For instance, the severe,
moderate and intermediate hardship IFE rates all dropped
0.4 percentage points between 1975 and 1980, so that both
the intermediate and moderate hardship IFE counts increas
ed in proportion to the severe hardship IFE count. The pat
terns were reversed in the case of the IFI, where the severe
hardship incidence rose 0.3 percentage points between 1975
and 1980, while the intermediate hardship IFI incidence rose
by 0.1 percentage points and the moderate hardship IFI in
cidence declined by 0.3 percentage points, thus reducing the
differential between the moderate and intermediate hardship
IFI counts and the severe hardship IFI.

The Unraveling Safety Net
for the Working Poor
The incidence of Inadequate Family Income did not
decline between 1974 and 1979, and actually rose between
1975 and 1980 because of the declining effectiveness of the
safety net for the working poor. The impact of nontransfer
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earnings supplements increased significantly over the period,
but the diminished impact of cash transfers more than offset
this favorable development. For instance, nontransfer earn
ing supplements raised 16.2 percent of the IFE out of pover
ty in 1975 compared to 19.5 percent in 1980, an increase of
3.3 percentage points. Yet transfer and nontransfer earnings
supplements combined lifted 47.3 percent of the working
poor out of poverty in 1975, but only 44.0 percent in 1980, a
decline of 3.3 percentage points. Among workforce par
ticipants who would have been poor in the absence of cash
transfers, 37.1 percent were raised out of poverty by cash
benefits received in 1975, compared to only 30.4 percent in
1980.
This drop occurred despite a slight decline in the real netof-transfer IFI average deficit between 1974 and 1979, as
well as between 1975 and 1980. It was not explained by
changing workforce composition or work experience pat
terns. For almost all subgroups in the workforce, there was a
noticeable drop in the poverty reduction impact of transfers.
The effectiveness of the safety net diminished as well for
the nonworking poor. Yet the slippage was greater among
the working poor. For instance, 50.7 percent of all persons in
households with no workforce participants in 1975 were
lifted out of poverty by cash benefits compared to 49.1 per
cent in 1980. This 1.6 percentage point drop compared to a
6.7 percentage point drop in the proportion of otherwise
poor families with at least one workforce participant who
were lifted out of poverty by cash transfers.

Hardship Over the Business Cycle
Hardship rises in recessions and declines during periods of
economic growth (Chart 7). The annual unemployment, HE
and IFE rates were highly correlated over the 1974-1980
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Chart?
Severe Hardship and Unemployment, 1974-1980
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period, although there was a lesser correlation between the
unemployment and IFI rates.
Correlation between
average annual
unemployment rate
and hardship incidence

Correlation between
percent workforce
experiencing
unemployment and
hardship incidence

.92

.91

.94

.87

.78

.69

Inadequate Individual
Earnings
Inadequate Family
Earnings
Inadequate Family
Income

However, the proportional fluctuations in hardship were
less severe than those in unemployment, since many of the
victims of recessions were already in hardship and their
situation deteriorated. In the 1974-1975 and 1979-1980
declines, the percentage increases in unemployment were
greater than the percentage increases in hardship.
1974-1975
Absolute
increase
(000)
Average annual
unemployment
Persons experiencing
unemployment
HE
IFE
IFI

1979-1980

Percentage
increase

Absolute
increase
(000)

Percentage
increase

2,754

54%

1,485

25%

2,568
3,589
1,760
906

14

13
15

2,942
4,478

16
16

1,831
1,410

20

14

14

The standard deviation of the average annual unemploy
ment rate over the 1974-1980 period was 15 percent of the
mean; the standard deviation in the HE, IFE and IFI rates
were 7, 7 and 9 percent of their respective means.
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The Victims of Recession
Though recessions exacerbate conditions for those who
suffer continuing structural employment problems, they also
undermine the well-being of the more advantaged segments
of the labor force who seldom face hardship under normal
circumstances.
—Prime age (25- to 44-year old) workers were underrepresented among those in hardship in 1974, accounting for
29 percent of persons with Inadequate Family Earnings com
pared to 40 percent of the workforce. Yet 43 percent of the
1974-1975 increment in the IFE were prime age workers.
—Male family heads were also underrepresented among
those in hardship, accounting for 40 percent of the 1974
workforce but only 27 percent of the persons in families with
below-poverty earnings in 1974. Nevertheless, they ac
counted for 40 percent of the 1974-1975 increase in the IFE.
—Workers who had completed some post-secondary
education accounted for 28 percent of the workforce but on
ly 14 percent of the persons in families with below-poverty
earning in 1974. They represented 25 percent of the reces
sionary increment in the IFE count.
—Whites, who constituted 89 percent of the 1974
workforce but only 76 percent of the IFE, accounted for 92
percent of the 1974-1975 IFE increase.
In the 1979-1980 recession, the same patterns prevailed but
were generally less pronounced, as suggested by the ratio of
each advantaged subgroup's share of the recession increment
of the IFE divided by its share of the pre-recession IFE.
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Male family heads
Workforce participants
who had completed some
post-secondary education
Whites
Prime age workers (25- to
44-year olds)

Share 1974-1975
IFE increment
Share 1974 IFE
1.47

Share 1979-1980
IFE increment
Share 1979 IFE
1.15

1.79
1.21

1.27
1.04

1.47

1.58

Policy Implications
The Remedies
To significantly alleviate labor market-related economic
hardship will require a combination of macroeconomic and
targeted structural measures, combined with expanded in
come transfers for the working poor. Full employment and
increased minimum wages are necessary but far from suffi
cient. Less than a fourth of the 1979 unemployed were in
families with inadequate earnings, only one in seven were in
poor families, and just a third of individuals with inadequate
earnings were in families with below-poverty earnings. Thus,
reductions in unemployment or increases in the minimum
wage which would reduce the incidence of Inadequate In
dividual Earnings would also affect many who were not in
hardship. Any disemployment effects from increased
minimum wages would be concentrated among those at the
end of the labor queue. Regressions using 1974-1980 annual
data suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the
legislated minimum wage (as measured relative to the real
value of the minimum wage averaged for the 1967-1980
period) was associated with a 1.9 percentage point reduction
in the HE rate, a 0.6 percentage point drop in the IFE rate
and a 0.3 percentage point drop in the IFI rate. Since the
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ratio of the legislated minimum divided by the average real
minimum ranged only from 94 percent in 1977 to 102 percent
in 1978, or a swing of 8 percentage points, this was not a ma
jor factor in hardship trends. A 1 percentage point decline in
average annual unemployment was associated with a 1.2
percentage point drop in the HE, a 0.5 percentage point drop
in the IFE and a 0.3 percentage point drop in the IFI.
Projecting 1982 hardship levels based on this simple
regression model for 1974 through 1980, and assuming, most
plausibly, that unemployment will average 9 percent in 1982
and inflation will erode only 5 percent from the unchanged
legislated minimum wage, the HE rate will be 30.7 percent,
the IFE rate, 14.2 percent, and the IFI rate, 8.0 percent (or
even higher, as retrenchment in transfer benefits is greater
than the 1970s downtrend). These projected levels for 1982
would contrast unfavorably with the 1979 lows of 24.2, 11.4
and 6.0 percent, respectively. Even if unemployment
miraculously dropped to a 7.0 percent level for the year, re
quiring a massive recovery in the summer and fall of 1982,
and even if inflation declined to a 2.5 percent annual rate,
the IFE would remain at 13.0 percent, almost the same as in
1975—while the IFI would be 7.2 percent, in contrast to 6.9
percent in 1975.
If all workers were provided minimally adequate in
dividual earnings, hardship would not be eliminated and
transfers would still be needed to alleviate deprivation
among workforce participants and their families. The IFE
would have been reduced by only 36 percent in 1979, and the
IFE Deficit by 41 percent, if the earnings of all persons were
augmented up to the minimum wage equivalent for all hours
of availability. If all people living in families with belowpoverty earnings in 1979 were provided employment at the
usual wage for any hours of forced idleness, and their earn
ings were then increased by 10 percent, 56 percent would
have remained with Inadequate Family Earnings, and they
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would have needed $22.1 billion in earnings supplements to
reach the poverty level. Thus, targeted manpower programs
providing minimum wage employment or marginal earnings
improvements would not eliminate the need for income
transfers.

Allocation and Targeting
The use of hardship measures to allocate and target
resources intended for the unemployed and underemployed
from low-income families would yield a substantially dif
ferent distribution among geographic areas and population
segments than the current method of allocating and targeting
based on unemployment shares or unemployment and pover
ty shares. Nonmetropolitan areas would benefit substantially
and so would the southern states. The nonmetropolitan area
share of the IFE tally, averaged for the 1974-1980 period,
was nearly two-fifths higher than the nonmetropolitan area
share of average annual unemployment, and a fifth above
the nonmetropolitan share of poverty and unemployment,
each equally weighted. If funds were allocated based on IFE
shares, the suburban rings of metropolitan areas would have
received a fourth less than if unemployment shares were the
determining factor, or a tenth less than if equally weighted
unemployment and poverty shares were used in allocation.
The West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Cen
tral, West South Central, and Mountain states would have
received a fourth more under an IFE-based allocation than
an unemployment-based allocation, and a tenth more than
under a poverty and unemployment share basis.
If resources were allocated according to need, and need
were determined on the basis of the IFE share rather than the
unemployment share, family heads (both males and females)
would have received greater priority. Also, there would have
been much more emphasis on helping older workers and less
on youth employment problems. Dropouts would have
received far more attention.
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Share of
unemployed

Winners
Share of
poverty and
unemployment

IFE
share

Male family heads
Female family heads
Unrelated individuals

18.8%
6.9
14.1

17.7%
11.9
24.2

24.5%
15.2
26.4

Dropouts

28.8

42.0

39.9

45 and over

16.5

29.4

36.2

Share of
unemployed

Losers
Share of
poverty and
unemployment

share

Wives
Other family
members
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IFE

19.7%

17.6%

14.1%

40.5

28.7

19.8

High school
graduates
Completers of some
post-secondary
education

38.4

30.7

30.2

22.9

17.1

18.1

16-19
20-24

26.6
23.1

19.7
18.5

13.4
17.1

Adding A Third Leg to Social Statistics
These assorted findings challenge much conventional
wisdom about how many and who are suffering as a result of
labor market problems. The same conclusions might be
reached by careful analysis of the detailed and disaggregated
labor force and income data, but the hardship measures pro
vide a systematic integration which provides new perspec
tives to the public and policymakers who have not been able
to piece together the hodgepodge of existing statistics. Those
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who do not like what they see from the hardship perspective
may argue that the measures distort reality because of the
value judgments, assumptions and technical problems im
plicit in the measures. It may be difficult to accept that so
many millions of Americans are unable to support
themselves and their families even when they are lucky
enough to find and hold jobs, that there has been little or no
progress in alleviating hardship over recent years, that the
burdens of labor market-related hardship are even more
maldistributed than the burdens of unemployment, that the
greater public concern with cyclical rather than structural
problems may be misplaced, that a rising tide will not lift all
boats, and that welfare and workfare must continue to
overlap if hardship is to be alleviated for those failing in or
failed by the labor market. It may be equally difficult to ad
mit that the unemployment and poverty statistics, which are
the foundation of public policy and public understanding,
are not effective in perhaps their primary applica
tion—measuring who and how many suffer as a result of
labor market problems. It is certainly no easy task to learn
an entirely new nomenclature, or to adjust and supplement
libraries of econometric studies and esoteric analyses which
are based on the assumption that unemployment rates are a
good proxy for labor market-related hardship. It is a for
midable challenge to fine-tune the hardship measures and to
modify the underlying survey instruments and approaches in
order to improve the accuracy and reliability of hardship
statistics. Yet if we are seriously committed to understanding
and alleviating the welfare consequences of labor market
problems, then the unemployment and poverty statistics
must be supplemented by new measures developed to in
tegrate earnings, work experience and income data in a
systematic way, recognizing the complexities of varying
family status, labor force attachment and patterns of work
experience. Social policies must, then, be redirected in light
of these new perspectives.
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In the specific area of productivity data and analysis, sim
ple labor productivity measures for the economy (or even for
the major sectors) are no longer sufficient with the changing
patterns of availability and cost of various inputs—and
especially in an economy which has moved away from a
century-long dependence upon industrial equipment driven
by cheap energy. Measures which relate output patterns to
the inputs of labor, materials, energy and capital are deemed
essential. These must be coupled with sound analyses of the
realities of "tradeoffs" of the input factors which have (or
could) contribute to improved efficiency and/or lowered
cost—of production and of the finished product.
Productivity measures must reflect today's realities of do
ing business. Most of the great strides in productivity gains
over the past century have come from technological im
provements and discoveries—the path to greater output per
hour (labor productivity) is through new technologies to in
vestment in new plant and machinery and on to more effi77
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cient labor. While it is true that improvements in industrial
organization and behavior, as well as enlightened
management-labor relationships, also contribute to gains in
productivity, the main engine of productivity improvement
is through capital.
People are said to be "inquisitive, acquisitive, and lazy."
They are "inquisitive" and search out how to do their work
better and more efficiently. They are "acquisitive" as they
like to acquire the tools to do their jobs better. And, they are
"lazy" in the sense that they would rather have machines
sweat and toil than themselves. Productivity gains are not
achieved by people working harder, but by giving them the
tools to work more efficiently and by giving them the incen
tives to do so.
Labor productivity is a partial productivity measure and,
as such, does not reflect the role of capital and the interac
tion between labor and capital. To quote the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) in the boxed-item of their periodic
"Productivity and Costs" report,
Although the productivity measures relate output to
the hours of all persons engaged in each sector, they do
not measure the specific contributions of labor, capital,
or any single factor of production. Rather, they reflect
the joint effects of many influences, including new
technology, capital investment, the level of output,
capacity utilization, energy use, and managerial skill, as
well as the skills and efforts of the work force.
The use of partial productivity measures is appropriate,
depending upon the circumstances and their use. For gaug
ing the efficiency of use of all resources, be it at the national
level or at a company, productivity measures which include
all inputs are the appropriate ones to use.
The making of policy, be it employment, inflation or out
put, requires empirical measures which correctly reflect our
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economic conditions. Such measures will always include
some degree of error, but the critical factor is that their
trends should be as free from systematic biases as possible.
This study will review several aspects of productivity
measurement since such measures represent one of the main
economic indicators of our economic well-being: the need
for total factor productivity measures; the impact of our
changing economic structure; the divergence between hours
worked and hours paid; and the undermeasurement of labor
in the real estate sector. Before embarking on the analytical
sections, it is useful to review why productivity is so impor
tant.
1. The "Big Picture"
The United States—and the entire free-world community
of nations—is presently in a revolutionary situation. Unfor
tunately, too few leaders of industry, academia or the
government recognize this fact and its significance for the
future. Specifically, in the late 1960s the U.S. was still the
world's leader in world trade, in standard of living, in
science and technology, in the world financial community,
and in productivity. By the end of the decade of the 70s, due
to a variety of errors of omission and commission together
with events outside control of our national leaders, we were
in the unenviable position of:
—Suffering three recessions in a single decade, with the
terminal one (1980), in the judgment of some experts, conti
nuing through 1981 and the first half of 1982.
—A complete catastrophe in productivity growth, with a
slowdown followed by actual declines in output per hour in
1978, 1979 and 1980 (and only about 1 percent rise in 1981).
—Rampant inflation, throughout the decade, with an in
crease in the late 70s to levels higher than in any former
peacetime period.
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—Unprecedentedly high interest rates, which stubbornly
refuse conventional "cures"; and these rates in turn virtually
assuring the collapse of the major construction sector and
catastrophic declines in the sale and production of other ma
jor consumer durables, particularly automobiles.
—Rates of unemployment higher than in any span since
the "Great Depression" of the 30s.
—Tremendous loss of our "normal" international
markets for manufactured goods, accompanied by a ma
jor—and growing—invasion of the U.S. domestic market by
imported manufactures, thus contributing to unemployment
and the virtual collapse (present or almost certainly assured
for the near future) of major mature U.S. industries.
—Persistent, very large adverse balance of payments.
As a result, the U.S. has lost its former lead in the export
of manufactured goods, and its role as the financial
bellwether or leader of the Western industrial world's finan
cial community.
Due to the above combination of factors (not the least of
which was our extremely weak comparative productivity
growth performance) and including the apparent inability of
U.S. leaders (of industry, labor and government) to work
together to maximize exports, many of our basic industries
were either already moribund or very ill indeed; and the U.S.
living standard had already fallen to a measurable degree.
2. Total Factor Productivity Measures
The need for productivity measures that include the role
of capital as well as labor has long been recognized by the
economic community, especially Professors Kendrick,
Jorgenson, Denison, and Griliches, among other productivi
ty researchers. 1 Until recently, only labor productivity
measures have been compiled and published on a regular
basis by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the private
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business economy and six sectors. Since 1980, the American
Productivity Center (APC) has been maintaining and
publishing total factor productivity using Professor Kendrick's approach. 2 The APC "Multiple Input Productivity
Index" program covers the private business economy, six
sectors, and thirty segments. Further, the APC measures of
output and labor hours are consistent with the BLS
measures.
Total factor productivity measures have been periodically
published since the late 1950s. Yet, it wasn't until 1979 that
the Rees Commission, under the auspices of the National
Academy of Sciences, 3 recommended the continuous
availability of productivity measures which also include the
role of capital:
Measures of multifactor productivity show
changes in the use of all measured inputs per unit of
output. Measures of output per worker hour may
increase only because inputs of capital or in
termediate goods have been substituted for labor
inputs. Thus, measures of productivity, which are
more complete measures of changes in productive
efficiency, generally rise less rapidly than measures
of labor productivity.
In any measure of multifactor productivity,
weights are needed to determine the shares of the
various inputs in the aggregate input measure.
These are ordinarily determined by the share of
total input value in some base period. The panel
recommended that BLS experiment with combining
labor and other inputs into alternative measures of
multifactor productivity. 4
The BLS has taken up this recommendation and is plan
ning to publish total factor productivity measures for the
private business and other major sectors by the end of 1982.
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It is understood that their measure of capital and their ap
proach to adding up the inputs will differ from that used by
the APC.
It should also be recognized that by including capital in
productivity measures adds to the problems of measuring
output and labor, (see Table I). The measurement of capital
stock presents more difficulties than measuring output or
labor hours, yet the approaches taken to measure capital are
consistent and theoretically sound. Such measures, then, are
appropriate in capturing broad trends in total and partial
productivity. 5
Labor productivity measures have been telling a rather
gloomy story of the progress of the U.S. economy since
1965. Before 1965, labor productivity for the private
business economy had been rising at an average annual rate
of 3.2 percent. Between 1965 and 1973, the growth rate fell
to 2.4 percent; labor productivity dropped even further
through 1979 to only a 0.8 percent rate. During the recession
years of 1979 through 1981, its rate again fell to 0.5 percent
rate, (see Table II).
As dismal as past economic performance is, measured by
labor productivity, the total factor measure is even gloomier.
Its pre-1965 rate is some 19 percent lower than when only the
role of labor is measured. Total factor productivity (TFP)
grew at an average 2.6 percent rate, as compared to 3.2 per
cent for labor productivity; over the 1965-73 period, the TFP
rate was 1.8 percent. Between 1973 and 1979, TFP was only
one-half the labor productivity rate, 0.4 percent, and since
1979 TFP has been declining at a 0.4 percent rate while labor
productivity has been increasing. Thus, when capital is in
cluded in our measure of productivity, the performance of
the U.S. economy is worse.
It is expected that TFP measures should show slower
growth than labor productivity. When capital is substituted
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Table I
Share of Private Business Economy
Output and Inputs
Selected Periods
(Percent)

1950
Private business economy
Farm
Nonfarm nonmanufacturing
Manufacturing
Goods-producing sector
Service-producing sector
Private business economy
Farm
Nonfarm nonmanufacturing
Manufacturing
Goods-producing sector
Service-producing sector

100.0
5.7
63.6
30.7
45.8
54.2

100.0
17.2
53.7
29.2
55.3
46.7

A. Output
1965 1975
100.0 100.0
3.3
3.8
63.7
66.2
32.5
30.5
40.9
45.9
59.1
54.1

1981
100.0
3.1
66.1
30.8
40.6
59.4

B. Labor Hours
100.0 100.0 100.0
4.2
5.4
8.2
68.1
65.7
60.0
27.7
28.9
31.8
40.3
41.8
47.6
59.7
58.2
52.4

C. Total Capital Input

Private business economy
Farm
Nonfarm nonmanufacturing
Manufacturing
Goods-producing sector
Service-producing sector

100.0
18.7
68.7
17.3
40.4
59.6

100.0
14.5
67.5
17.9
38.1
61.9

100.0
11.4
70.5
18.1
34.4
65.6

100.0
10.2
71.4
18.5
33.6
66.4

SOURCES: American Productivity Center; Pace University.
NOTE: Goods producing includes manufacturing, farm, mining, and contract construc
tion segments.
Service producing includes transportation, communications, public utilities, trade, finance
and insurance, real estate, and services segment as defined by the American Productivity
Center's Multiple Input Productivity approach.
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for labor, output may rise, leading to an increase in labor
productivity. However, measured TFP would not rise as
much since the increase in capital is also included in this
measure. In this case, the rise in productive efficiency
measured by labor productivity is overstated.
Table II
Labor and Total Factor Productivity
Private Business Economy
(Annual Percent Change, Selected Periods)
Labor
Productivity

Period
1948-81
1948-65
1965-73
1973-79
1979-81

Rate
2.4%
3.2
2.4
0.8
0.5

Percent
Decline
—
—
25%
67
38

Total Factor
Productivity
Rate
1.8%
2.6
1.8
0.4
-0.4

Percent
Decline
—
—
31%
78
200

SOURCES: American Productivity Center; Pace University.

The Post-1965 Slowdown. The falloff in productivity
growth rates since 1965, as well as some likely causes, has
been well-documented elsewhere. 6 As exhibited by Table II,
both the partial labor productivity and TFP rates have con
sistently declined in each of the post-war subperiods: in this
case too, labor productivity understates the slowdown. Be
tween the 1948-65 and 1965-73 subperiods, labor productivi
ty growth rates dropped 0.8 percentage points, or declined 25
percent. In contrast, total factor productivity growth rates
fell 31 percent. The 1973-79 subperiod exhibited an even
more severe falloff in its productivity performance from the
previous period, declining 67 percent. Again, the TFP rate
slowed down even more, 78 percent.
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The moderation in productivity rates continued after
1979, but much of this poor performance can be associated
with the two (or possibly one) recessions, the last of which
we are still experiencing at the time of this writing. It should
be noted, however, that the recent year-to-year performance
of productivity is slightly encouraging. In 1981, labor pro
ductivity reversed its decline of the previous years, and rose
at a 1 percent rate. Total factor productivity also increased
after several years of declines, at a somewhat milder rate of
0.4 percent. In measuring the post-1965 slowdown of pro
ductivity, we again see that it has been much more severe
when gauged by the more inclusive total factor productivity
measure than when looking at labor productivity only.
3. The Changing Economic Structure
The structure of the U.S. economy has been changing over
the post-World War II period, reflecting changing tastes and
preferences, new technologies and products, altered resource
availability and costs, the impact of taxes and other govern
ment economic and social policies, as well as increasing
foreign competition. As the economy shifts from a goodsproducing to a more service-producing economy, these shifts
alone would affect measured productivity.
For example, in 1950 over 17 percent of all hours worked
were in the farm sector; by 1965 the farm sector contributed
only 8 percent to total private business labor input. Much of
this shift in labor was to the service-producing sector. Such a
shift would affect measured productivity even if within each
sector productivity did not change.
Table II presents the shifts in the U.S. private business
economy over the past 33 years. In terms of output, there
was hardly any change in the economy's structure between
1950 and 1965; about 46 percent of output was from the
goods-producing sector and 54 percent from service-
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producing industries. (There was a slight shift from the farm
sector to manufacturing.) Between 1965 and 1975, the
economy incurred a substantial change in its structure. Dur
ing this tumultuous 10-year period, the goods-producing sec
tor's share of output dropped to 41 percent, a decline of 5
percentage points. The U.S. economy became more serviceoriented, currently producing about 59 percent of output.
Further, the manufacturing industries' contribution dropped
back to its 1950 share of 31 percent.
Examination of the changing proportions of labor and
capital inputs among the major sectors of the private
business economy tells the same story: the U.S. is an increas
ingly service-oriented economy. As of 1981, 60 percent of
labor's efforts and over 66 percent of the capital stock is
devoted to service-oriented activities including transporta
tion, communications, public utilities, wholesale and retail
trade, finance, insurance, real estate, and business services.
The farm sector's claim on resources dropped dramatically
between 1950 and 1975, but has now stabilized. (The shift
from farm to other activities is now over and has been for
many years.) Manufacturing continues to claim resources
very much in the same proportions in 1981 as it did in 1950.
The Impact of Services. The question then is how this shift
from goods- to service-producing industries has affected
measured productivity. Many of the more serious problems
in measuring real output and capital inputs are associated
with the service-producing sector: defining and measuring
real output, and defining and measuring real capital stock;
even measuring labor inputs for the service-oriented in
dustries is more difficult. We will see that the real estate sec
tor is a case in point. Basically, most of services deal with in
tangible types of outputs: financial advice, the sale of a
house, accounting services, even economic consulting. It is
very difficult to define what is the output of a particular ser-
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vice. It is even more difficult to measure price changes in
order to deflate the output data.
Some analysts have attributed a proportion of the
slowdown in productivity growth to the shift from the
"more productive" goods-producing to the "less produc
tive" service-producing industries. One reason many
analysts consider service industries to be less productive is
that output measures may be underestimated, leading to
downward biased productivity measures. In order to ex
amine this question, our measure of total factor productivity
for private business economy was recalculated, holding the
proportion of output, labor and capital inputs at their 1965
levels (see Tables I and III).
The impact of the changing economic structure on total
factor productivity is exhibited by Chart I. Between 1948 and
1965 there is a marked difference in the trends of the variable
structure total factor productivity (VS-TFP) and the con
stant structure total factor productivity (CS-TFP). After that
period, there is very little difference in their respective
trends. The growth rates of TFP bear this fact out (see Table
IV); between 1948 and 1965, VS-TFP grew at an average rate
of 2.6 percent, some 12 percent lower than the 2.9 percent
rate of TFP when the structure is held constant. Over the
post-1965 subperiods, the rates of growth of both VS-TFP
and CS-TFP are almost exactly the same.
During this earlier 1948-65 period, the proportion of out
put changed but little (see Table I); the same is true in regard
to capital input. The significant changes occurred in the pro
portion of labor hours; labor hours in the goods-producing
sector declined almost 8 percentage points, from 55.3 per
cent in 1950 to 47.6 percent in 1965. Of course, the serviceproducing sector gained this amount. Between 1965 and 1975
the goods-producing sector again lost share, about 6 percent,
dropping to 41.8 percent.
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Table III
Proportion of Private Business Economy
Output and Inputs
as of 1965

Manufacturing
Food
Tobacco
Textiles
Apparel
Lumber
Furniture
Paper
Printing and publishing
Chemicals
Petroleum
Rubber
Leather
Stone, clay and glass
Primary metals
Fabricated metals
Machinery excluding electric
Electrical machinery
Transportation equipment
Instruments
Miscellaneous manufacturers
Nonfarm nonmanufacturing
Mining
Contract construction
Transportation
Communications
Public utilities
Trade
Finance and insurance
Real estate
Services

Output
.325
.032
.005
.010
.011
.011
.005
.011
.018
.020
.008
.009
.003
.012
.030
.024
.034
.025
.044
.008
.005

Labor
.318
.031
.001
.016
.021
.012
.007
.012
.017
.016
.003
.009
.006
.011
.022
.025
.032
.028
.034
.008
.007

Capital
.179
.017
.002
.007
.003
.003
.002
.011
.005
.020
.011
.004
.001
.008
.029
.010
.016
.009
.017
.003
.002

.541
.022
.075
.051
.023
.027
.203
.049
.061
.127

.524
.012
.064
.050
.015
.011
.255
.041
.012
.140

.619
.043
.012
.070
.027
.061
.077
.015
.193
.176

SOURCES: American Productivity Center; Pace University.
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Table IV
Total Factor Productivity and Related Indexes
by Major Sector
(Selected Periods, 1948-1981)
1948-79

Average Annual Rates of Change
1948-65 1965-73 1973-79 1979-81

A. Total Factor Productivity
1. Variable Structure
Private business economy
Goods-producing sector
Service-producing sector
Manufacturing industry

2.6
3.1
1.8
2.6

1.8
2.2
1.4
2.3

0.4
0.4
0.5
0.8

-0.4
-0.2
-0.4
-0.4

2. Constant Structure
Private business economy
Goods-producing sector
Service-producing sector
Manufacturing

2.0
2.5
1.4
1.8

2.9
3.8
1.9
2.4

1.9
2.4
1.4
2.2

0.4
0.4
0.6
0.6

-0.4
-0.4
-0.2
-0.5

B. Labor Productivity
1. Variable Structure
Private business economy
Goods-producing sector
Service-producing sector
Manufacturing

2.4
2.8
1.9
2.6

3.2
3.8
2.3
3.0

2.4
2.6
2.2
2.8

0.8
0.9
0.7
1.5

0.5
1.0
0.3
1.0

2. Constant Structure, 1965
Private business economy
Goods-producing sector
Service-producing sector
Manufacturing

2.0
3.1
1.9
1.8

2.9
4.4
2.4
2.4

1.9
2.9
2.2
2.2

0.4
0.9
0.7
0.6

-0.4
0.7
0.3
-0.5

C. Capital Productivity
1. Variable Structure
Private business economy
Goods-producing sector
Service-producing sector
Manufacturing

0.2
0.3
0.2
0.0

0.8
1.0
0.5
0.9

0.1
0.7
-0. 1
0.3

-0.5
-1.1
0.1
-1.5

-2.3
-3.1
-1.5
-4.2

2. Constant Structure, 1965
Private business economy
Goods-producing sector
Service-producing sector
Manufacturing

0.3
0.3
0.4
-0.2

0.9
1.1
0.7
0.7

0.2
0.7
0.1
0.2

-0.5
-1.3
0.3
-1.7

-2.3
-3.6
-1.2
-4.3
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Table IV (continued)
Total Factor Productivity and Related Indexes
by Major Sector
(Selected Periods, 1948-1981)
1948-79

Private business economy
Goods-producing sector
Service-producing sector
Manufacturing

3.3
2.8
3.6
3.3

Private business economy
Goods-producing sector
Service-producing sector
Manufacturing

3.1
2.7
3.5
3.1

Average Annual Rates of Change
1948-65 1965-73 1973-79 1979-81
D. Real Output
1. Variable Structure
3.6
3.5
3.6
4.0

3.9
3.2
4.3
4.1

2.7
1.7
3.4
2.1

0.6
-0.9
1.7
-1.3

2. Constant Structure, 1965
3.5
3.4
3.5
3.7

3.6
3.0
4.2
3.8

2.4
1.4
3.3
1.8

0.2
-1.3
1.5
-1.5

E. Labor Input
1. Variable Structure
Private business economy
Goods-producing sector
Service-producing sector
Manufacturing

0.9
0.0
1.7
0.8

Private business economy
Goods-producing sector
Service-producing sector
Manufacturing

0.5
-0.5
1.6
0.6

0.4
-0.4
1.2
1.0

1.4
0.6
2.1
1.2

1.9
0.8
2.7
0.6

0.1
-1.8
1.4
-2.3

2. Constant Structure, 1965
-0.1
-0.9
1.1
0.9

1.0
0.1
2.0
1.1

1.6
0.5
2.6
0.4

-0.3
-1.9
1.1
-2.5

F. Capital Input
1. Variable Structure
Private business economy
Goods-producing sector
Service-producing sector
Manufacturing

3.1
2.5
3.5
3.3

Private business economy
Goods-producing sector
Service-producing sector
Manufacturing

2.8
2.4
3.1
3.3

2.8
2.4
3.1
3.1

3.7
2.5
4.5
3.7

3.1
2.9
3.3
3.6

3.0
2.3
3.3
3.0

2. Constant Structure, 1965
2.6
2.3
2.8
3.1

SOURCES: American Productivity Center; Pace University.

3.4
2.2
4.1
3.6

2.8
2.7
2.9
3.5

2.6
2.4
2.7
2.9
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This significant gain in the service-producing sector's
share of labor hours is reflected in the differing growth rates
of variable structure labor productivity and constant struc
ture labor productivity. During each of the four post-war
subperiods examined, when the structure of output and
labor input are held constant, the rates of growth of labor
productivity are significantly lower. And the divergence in
their respective growth rates increases as we approach the
1980s. Thus, the shift from a goods- to a service-oriented
economy has had a significant impact on labor productivity
throughout the 1948-81 period, but not significant after 1965
when productivity is measured using the total factor ap
proach.
Again, we see the importance of including capital in the
measure of productivity. Interestingly, there is little dif
ference in capital productivity growth rates between the
variable and constant structure measures.
Output and Inputs. Table IV also presents the impact on
output and labor and capital input growth rates for all three
series; and for each subperiod, when the structure is held
constant, the growth rates are lower than in the variable
structure case. This result is expected since an economy nor
mally shifts output and resources to industries which are ex
periencing greater growth in demand. Further, higher pro
ductivity growth industries tend to have slower rising prices,
which encourages increasing demand and output, and higher
profit margins, which also encourages and attracts more
resources.
Translating these increases in output, labor and capital in
to faster-rising productivity depends upon their relative
growth rates. As we saw, the major divergence was in regard
to labor productivity, the difference in output growth rates
(1948-65) was only 0.1 percentage points, yet labor input
declined at a Q.I percentage rate when when the structure
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was held constant, as compared to an actual (variable struc
ture) use of 0.4 percent per annum. The divergence in capital
input growth rates over this same period was also minimal,
0.1 percentage points. Here, too, we see that the strong shift
in labor explains the divergence in labor productivity growth
rates.
Within-Sector Shifts. Shifts of output and inputs within a
sector will also impact its measured productivity growth
rates. Apparently shifts within the goods-producing sector
had a substantial impact on total factor productivity growth
rates over the 1948-65 subperiod, 3.1 percent versus 3.8 per
cent for the variable and constant structures, respectively.
After that period, the differences are much smaller. Much of
this difference in the early period can be attributed to shifts
in labor among the goods-producing sectors. Since there is
only a small difference in manufacturing VS-TFP and CSTFP growth rates, most of the divergence within the goodsproducing sector must be due to the shift from farm to nonfarm labor in the early post-war period.
Within the service-producing sector, there is very little dif
ference in growth rates of VS-TFP and CS-TFP. Apparent
ly, there have been only small shifts of labor, and output and
capital, within this sector.
Rate, Level and Interaction Effects. Gains in productivity
can be separated into rate, level and interaction effects. The
rate effect is the growth in productivity due to withinindustry productivity gains. The level effect is due to shifts in
the composition or structure of the economy, holding
within-industry productivity constant. The interaction effect
is a result of the interaction between the rate and level ef
fects.
The estimates of constant structure growth rates presented
above are approximations of the rate effect. Unfortunately,
there is no approach available to decompose total factor pro-
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ductivity into rate, level and interaction effects. However, it
is possible to do so for labor productivity. 7 Using a 60-sector
disaggregation, Beebe and Haltmaier estimate the rate and
level effects for selected subperiods: 8
Decomposition of labor productivity
(Annual rates of change)
1973-78
1965-73
1948-65
Private domestic
economy
Total
Rate
Level

3.24
2.79
0.45

2.54
2.22
0.33

1.00
0.93
0.10

This table indicates that the level effect accounted for 13.9
percent of the rate of productivity growth between 1948 and
1965, 13 percent over the 1965-73 period, and 10 percent
over the 1973-78 period. In order to isolate which sectors ac
count for the level effect, Beebe and Haltmaier use a twosector approach, isolating each sector in a separate calcula
tion. Their findings are that farming accounts for most of
the level effect, especially in the earliest subperiod, 0.41,
0.18, and 0.05, for the three subperiods, respectively. Our
constant-structure approach agrees with their findings.
4. The Hours Paid Bias
The BLS establishment survey known as the Current
Employment Statistics Survey (709), has three major prob
lems in regards to productivity measurement:
1. Self-employed and unpaid family workers are excluded.
In the BLS sector estimates and the APC sector/industry
estimates of productivity, self-employed and unpaid family
workers are included, albeit using indirect methods. In con
trast, direct industry estimates would be based on imputa
tions by sector of self-employed and unpaid family worker
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employment, using estimates from the Current Population
Survey. At least this source of bias is addressed.
2. Average hours estimates cover only production workers
in mining and manufacturing, and all nonsupervisory
workers in other industries. Generally, in calculating total
hours worked, average hours of supervisory (nonproduction) are assumed to be the same as nonsupervisory (produc
tion) workers. As of 1977, about 18 percent of total workers
in nonagricultural industries, and about 28 percent of mining
and manufacturing workers had their hours estimated under
this assumption. It is not clear what direction this assump
tion would bias our productivity measures, if any. The trend
has been towards working less hours per week, at least until
the early 1960s. This trend applies to both supervisory and
nonsupervisory workers. More likely, these estimates lead to
a cyclical bias in that production workers' hours are lowered
during business downturns, but nonproduction personnel
hours generally stay the same.
3. The major problem is that the establishment survey
measures hours paid instead of hours worked. Hours paid
includes vacations, sick-leave, holidays, coffee breaks, and
the like. If the difference between hours paid and worked
had stayed the same since 1948, productivity trends would
not be affected, and only productivity levels would be biased
downwards.
But in reality the trend has been towards more hours that
are paid but do not represent work. Evidence on this trend is
sketchy but very convincing. In 1966, 83 percent of total
compensation was for working time (all nonagricultural in
dustries, see Table V). By 1970 this figure dropped to 81.9
percent, and to 76.7 percent by 1977, the last year such infor
mation was published. During this same period, pay for
leave excluding sick went from 5.2 percent of total compen
sation to 6.1 percent. Other evidence indicates that between
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1965 and 1976, the maximum allowable vacation of plant
workers rose from 3.3 weeks per annum to 3.9 weeks, and
from 3.6 weeks to 4.1 weeks for office workers. 9
This problem was addressed as early as 1976 by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. 10 They recognized the impact this bias
has on productivity measures and they attempted to rectify
for the lack of hours worked data. After reviewing the
several employment surveys conducted by the federal
government, they recommended that the Current Employ
ment Statistics Survey be expanded to include hours worked
information.''
Table V
Percent of Total Compensation
by Type of Activity
All Industries
Selected Years
(Percent)

Activity
Total
Pay for working time
Pay for leave
(excluding sick)
Vacation
Holidays
Employer expenditures
Sick leave
Wages and salaries
(Gross pay)
Supplements to W&S
W&S less pay for working

1966
100.0
83.0

1970
100.0
81.9

1974
100.0
78.2

1977
100.0
76.7

5.2
3.1
1.9

5.6
3.3
2.1

6.0
3.4
2.3

6.1
3.4
2.3

0.6

0.7

0.7

0.8

89.9
10.1

89.0
11.0

86.3
13.7

84.6
15.4

6.9

7.1

8.1

7.9

SOURCE: Handbook of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 2070, U.S. Department of Labor, Table
132, "Employee Compensation, Private Nonagricultural Economy, Selected Years,
1966-77," December 1980, pp. 308-318.
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In their approach to defining what comprised hours work
ed, they had several somewhat competing uses in mind, in
cluding labor negotiations and productivity measurement.
They finally recommended the use of the concept "hours at
work," which they defined as "all time during which an
employee is necessarily required to be on the employer's
premises, on duty, or at a prescribed work place." 12
In addition to regular working time where the
employee is engaged in productive activity, hours at
work thus include short rest periods and coffee
breaks, standby or ready time, downtime, portal to
portal pay only if paid, washup time only if paid,
travel time from job site to job site within the work
ing day, travel away from home if it cuts across the
working day, and paid training periods during
working hours. Hours at work exclude normal
travel time from home to work, unpaid wash time,
and lunch time . . . the major items excluded from
hours at work are vacations, holidays, and
absences due to sickness or personal or civic
reasons. 113
About 90 percent of paid but not at-work time is due to
vacations. This definition does include some nonwork time
which would be better excluded for productivity measure
ment purposes, but these items represent a very small pro
portion of nonwork time.
For illustrative purposes, estimated total hours paid for
the nonfarm sector were adjusted to an hours worked basis.
The adjustment is based on the evidence given in the BLS
Report. 14 This table indicates that hours worked were 95.2
percent of hours paid in 1952, and declined an average of 0.1
percentage points per annum through 1966, the same annual
percentage point decline as presented in Table V. Taking the
1952 figure of 95.2 percent as a benchmark, we assumed
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through extrapolation that hours worked were 95.6 percent
of hours paid in 1948, and 92.3 percent in 1981. (All in
tervening years were linearly interpolated.)
Labor productivity and total factor productivity were
calculated using adjusted hours worked labor input. Chart II
shows the trends in the hours worked and hours paid
measures of total factor productivity (assuming both
measures are equal to 100 in 1948). It is clear that the hours
paid measures are an underestimate of TFP, and that this
bias increases over time.
The differences in rates of growth for the nonfarm sector
are not very large, no more than 2 percentage points (see
Table VI). But over long periods of time, small percentage
differences in growth rates lead to substantial differences in
levels. For example, if it is assumed that total factor produc
tivity using hours worked and hours paid measures were
equal in 1948—as was done for Chart II—hours paid TFP
would rise 61.8 percent by 1981 (at a 1.5 percent rate) and
hours worked TFP, 71.2 percent (at a 1.6 percent rate). The
gap between these two measures widens steadily over time
and reaches 5.8 percent by 1981.
Using hours paid rather than hours worked leads to an
understatement of both the level and the rate of growth of
total factor productivity and labor productivity. While this
conclusion implies that the productivity problem facing the
U.S. economy is not as bad as has been measured by current
ly available data, we still must conclude that since 1965 pro
ductivity gains have slowed down substantially and that since
1973 they have been nonexistent.
Stafford and Duncan report that their survey "shows that
the divergence between hours worked and hours paid ac
counts for as much as one-third of the productivity
slowdown." 15 Further, Norsworthy etal. report that the rate
of change in the ratio of hours worked to hours paid for the
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Chart II
Total Factor Productivity
Hours Paid Versus Hours Worked
Nonfarm Business Economy
1948-1981
(1948=100)

110-

o
tto

SOURCE: American Productivity Center.
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private nonfarm business sector was -0.06 percent from 1952
to 1965, -0.21 for 1965 to 1973, and -0.12 from 1973 to
1975. 16
They conclude that the results are "not striking" but that
there "is a small, persistent but variable decline in the ratio
of hours worked to hours paid." 17 Neither we nor Norsworthy attribute a significant proportion of the decline in
productivity to the divergence between hours worked and
hours paid. However, we are in agreement that the BLS
should continue with their plans to expand their survey to in
clude hours worked.

Table VI
Total Factor Productivity
Nonfarm Sector

Subperiod
1948-81
1948-65
1965-73
1973-79
1979-81

Year
1965
1973
1979
1981

A. Growth Rates, Selected Periods
Hours Worked*
Hours Paid
1.6%
1.5%
2.3
2.1
1.6
1.5
0.4
0.2
-0.4
-0.6
B. Percent Difference in Hours Worked
and Hours Paid**
Labor
Total Factor
Productivity
Productivity
3.3%
3.3%
5.7
4.5
7.0
5.5
7.5
5.8

SOURCES: The American Productivity Center; Pace University.
*For illustrative purposes only.
**Assumes that both measures equal each other in 1948.
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5. Underestimate of Labor in the Real Estate Sector
There is evidence that the Current Employment Statistics
program underestimates labor hours in the real estate sector.
Traditionally, much of the effort in this sector is by in
dividuals working on a commission basis and on their own
time. The establishment survey apparently underestimates
the amount of labor effort by nqnpayroll personnel and, as
such, undercounts the number of employees.
Information provided by the National Association of
Realtors (NAR) 18 indicates that the BLS survey is only cap
turing approximately 16 percent of the total labor force in
this sector, which implies that a more correct estimate of real
estate labor is about six times the published figure. Another
source of underestimation is the average hours paid (worked)
per week. Currently, only nonsupervisory workers are
covered, and real estate is not broken out from the broader
finance, insurance, and real estate sector. Therefore, this
estimate of average hours must be used in calculating total
real estate labor hours.
Table VII presents employee information provided by the
NAR. 19 About 84 percent of the total workforce is made up
of salespersons, and only 16 percent are in-office personnel.
This number appears to be fairly stable over the 1976-81
period. Unfortunately, no data is available prior to 1976 so
no trend can reasonably be inferred.
The BLS estimates that nonsupervisory workers are paid
for an average of 36 hours per week. Real estate salespersons
average over 40 hours according to NAR surveys, and
brokers over 50 hours per week. Here, too, we have a rather
significant understatement of employee activity in this sec
tor.
Finally, the distribution of gross income indicates that
some 13 percent goes to cover payroll-type costs, and 45 per-
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cent to commissions, adding up to total labor costs of 58 per
cent. This proportion is way below estimates of labor's share
of total factor costs as compiled from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. In 1978 the APC has calculated that
labor compensation, after an imputation for self-employed
is added on, was only 8 percent of total factor costs, way
below the figure implied by NAR data.
The data provided by the NAR are compelling. Two fac
tors ar highlighted which signal likely labor measurement
problems for the real estate sector:
1. The level of real output per hour for the real estate sec
tor is almost 40 percent higher than any other nonfarm
nonmanufacturing sector. (In 1979, output per hour
was $27.42—in 1972 dollars—as compared to $19.76 for
public utilities.)
2. Labor's share of factor income is the lowest of all nonfarm nonmanufacturing sectors. (In 1978, real estate's
labor share was 8 percent, about one-fourth the 36.5
percent labor share of the public utility sector.)
Unfortunately, the data provided by the NAR survey
would lead to hour and employee estimates which are
unrealistically high. Using their data and adjusting BLS
estimates of the number of employees and average hours for
real estate, we would derive estimates of aggregate hours of
13.6 billion and employment of 6.4 million workers. Even
though these estimates are not acceptable, the NAR survey
results do indicate that there is a substantial underestimate of
labor effort in the real estate sector.

103

Establishment Data & Productivity Measurements

Table VII
Real Estate Sector
Labor Characteristics
Selected Years
1. Employment by Type
(Percent of workforce)

Salespersons
In-office nonsales personnel
Total

1976

1978

82.2%
17.8
100.0

84.0%
16.0
100.0

2. Distribution of Hours per Week
1975a
Percent
Percent
40 & over
under 40
70.2

29.8

Salespersons
Brokers

1981
84.6%
15.4
100.0
1978

Percent
under 40
39.2
17.9

Percent
40 & over
60.8
82.1

1981

Salespersons
Brokers

Percent
under 40

Percent
40 & over

45.9
23.3

54.1
76.7

3. Average Hours per Week
1978
1975
47

Salespersons
Brokers
BLS FIREb

36.5

45
50
36.4

4. Distribution of Gross Income
(Percent)
1978
1975
13.3%
14.1%
45.0
44.0
58.3
58.1

Payroll-type costs
Commissions
Total labor costs
Other costs (occupancy,
communications, advertising,
sales promotion, etc.)

Total all costs

41.9
100.0

41.7
100.0

1981
41
51
36.3

1981
13.2%
46.0
59.2
40.8
100.0

SOURCES: National Association of Realtors; The American Productivity Center; Pace
University.
a. Realtor associates, salespersons and brokers.
b. Nonsupervisory worker, Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate.
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6. Conclusion and Recommendations
In the specific field of employment and hours data, as
generated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, several conclu
sions are apparent:
1. To properly capture gains in productive efficiency, the
role of capital must be included at the sector level, and in
termediate materials and energy inputs should be added if
measuring productivity at more detailed levels. Because of
substitution among the various inputs, labor productivity
measures are biased upwards.
2. The shift from a goods-producing to a service-oriented
economy had a significant effect on measured productivity
in the early part of the post-World War II era, but has not
affected productivity growth rates since 1965. If productivity
is measured by labor productivity, there appear to have been
labor-shift effects since 1965, but these effects are incorrect.
The shift to more services has not contributed significantly
to the post-1965 productivity slowdown.
3. The current practice of estimating hours paid rather
than hours worked by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
significantly biases productivity growth rates downwards.
While the bias is significant, it does not account for the
post-1965 productivity slowdown.
4. For some sectors—especially the real estate sector—the
true aggregate of hours devoted to gainful endeavor and the
number of persons involved in generating the value-added
"output" for the sector is seriously understated by the BLS
exclusion of "non-office sales personnel." This exclusion
undoubtedly exerts some effect in a number of the service in
dustries, but is especially serious for real estate. According to
the National Association of Realtors data, not less than
three-fourths of the total number of persons gainfully
employed by the industry (and probably an even larger
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percentage of the hours actually worked) are non-office sales
personnel, paid for either entirely or very largely on a com
mission basis. With this exclusion, the computation of a
meaningful productivity level (output per hour) is not possi
ble; and with an output per hour trend based on perhaps 20
to 25 percent of the total human resources input, the validity
is indeed questionable.
The technical problems reviewed here are important but
should not detract us from some basic economic problems
facing the U.S. economy. Our declining productivity perfor
mance, which is clearly evident regardless of any biases in
estimation, continues to erode our national vitality and inter
national competitiveness. While the technical recommenda
tions are clear—measure total factor productivity and
measure hours at work—how we can revive our economy's
efficiency of operation is more difficult to fathom.
As matters stand, it is obvious that the U.S. industrial
community of the future will inevitably be altogether dif
ferent from that of the past. If we are to avoid the fate of na
tions in the past who fell from the position of world leader
ship to the status of third-rate or fourth-rate powers, we
must:
*Develop new—and high-technology—industries and ex
pand them rapidly;
* Carry out wide-ranging actions to maximize productivi
ty, flexibility and general acceptance of change and new ap
proaches in existing, mature industry;
* Substantially increase diffusion throughout every seg
ment of the industrial community of "best practice";
*Encourage development of the requisite new skills re
quired for new high-tech industries and for the more
automated, robotized plants of the future in extant in
dustries;
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* Direct improvements in productivity and general opera
tional efficiency in the growing service industry segment of
the economy.
In addition to industrial restructuring toward services and
technology-oriented industries and improvements in its
overall effectiveness, it appears essential that new and im
aginative approaches be shaped for on-going collaboration
of the government, industry and labor to expand U.S.
fabricated goods exports in the world marketplace, plus ef
fective action in exporting efficient, flexible U.S. "services,"
including transportation, communications, finance and pro
fessional services.
Further, it appears likely that the U.S. will also be
able—as it must—to expand further its still-extant lead in the
production and export of agricultural products. Here, again,
new technologies (including hydroponics, photosynthesis
and bioregulators) will be required to meet the needs of the
twenty-first century and to help assure retention by the U.S.
of at least a relatively high standard of living.
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Longitudinal Labor Market Data
Sources, Uses, and Limitations
Orley Ashenfelter
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Until recently, most research on labor force behavior and
experience analyzed cross section data, which pertain to a
population sample at a single point in time. Recent years,
however, have seen the development of several longitudinal
data bases, which follow the same individuals over multiple
points in time.
Two factors have contributed to the development of
longitudinal information. One is that convincing research on
a number of public policy issues requires longitudinal data.
Indeed, without longitudinal data, some important research
issues cannot be addressed at all. For example, appropriate
public policy towards poverty, unemployment, and welfare
dependence rests partly on whether families' or individuals'
experience of these states is typically transitory or chronic.
Cross-sectional snapshots of the poor or the unemployed,
which focus on different individuals at different times, can
not possibly reveal how many of those poor or unemployed
at one time remain poor or unemployed at later dates. Such
questions of state persistence necessitate longitudinal track109
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ing of the same individuals. Still other issues previously ad
dressed with cross section data can be treated with more
reliable research methods when longitudinal information is
available. For example, longitudinal data have enabled more
thorough investigations of the effects of government training
programs on earnings and the wage impact of union status.
The second factor is that the cost of developing useful
longitudinal data sets is no longer prohibitive. In some cases,
computerized matching of existing administrative records
can produce inexpensive longitudinal information. In other
cases, valuable longitudinal data bases can be generated by
computerized matching of existing administrative and survey
data. Even where the desired longitudinal information can
be collected only by initiating new surveys, the advance of
computerized data management systems has made
longitudinal data development cost-effective in the last 15
years.
The purpose of this paper is first to describe briefly the
major sources of longitudinal data and their relative merits.
The discussion then turns to a review of the types of analysis
for which longitudinal information has proven especially
useful.

Sources of Longitudinal Labor Market Data
Longitudinal labor market data have been generated in
three main ways. The first is longitudinal matching of ad
ministrative records on participants in government pro
grams. The most prominent example is the Social Security
Administration's Continuous Work History Sample
(CWHS). This data set contains longitudinal earnings
records for a sample of workers covered by the social securi
ty program. Another example is the Labor Department's
Continuous Wage and Benefit History (CWBH), which con
tains longitudinal information on the earnings, benefit ex-
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perience, and other characteristics of a sample of workers
covered by unemployment insurance. The Labor Depart
ment has also assembled the Continuous Longitudinal Man
power Survey (CLMS) data, which consist partly of ad
ministrative information on a sample of enrollees in pro
grams funded under the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act.
Surveys are a second source of longitudinal data.
Longitudinal survy data can be collected either through onetime retrospective surveys that obtain information on in
dividuals' past experience or through panel surveys that
periodically reinterview the same individuals. The latter ap
proach is exemplified by the National Longitudinal Surveys
(NLS) of labor market experience and the Panel Study of In
come Dynamics (PSID). The NLS project, conducted for the
Labor Department by the Census Bureau, the National
Opinion Research Center, and Ohio State University's
Center for Human Resource Research, has followed samples
of several age-sex cohorts: men of age 45 to 59 in 1966, men
14 to 24 in 1966, women 30 to 44 in 1967, women 14 to 24 in
1968, and men and women 14 to 21 in 1979. The original
sample size for each of the 1960s cohorts was about 5,000 in
dividuals, and the 1979 cohort started with over 12,000 in
dividuals. The wide variety of information collected by NLS,
as Michael Borus [3] put it, "includes everything you always
wanted to know about individuals that the Census Bureau
was not afraid to ask."
The PSID effort, initiated by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare and conducted by the University of
Michigan's Survey Research Center, has collected since 1968
a similarly wide variety of information on a national sample
of families that overrepresents low-income families. As some
of the original 4,800 families have split and rearranged,
PSID has interviewed the originally sampled individuals'
new family units so that, despite sample attrition, the sample
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has actually grown over time. Other special longitudinal
surveys, described elsewhere, 1 include the Longitudinal
Retirement History Study, the National Longitudinal Study
of the High School Class of 1972, Project Talent, High
School and Beyond, and the NBER-Thorndike-Hagen
survey.
Another important panel survey is the Current Population
Survey (CPS), the monthly national household survey by the
Census Bureau that produces the unemployment rate and
other regular labor force statistics. Although the CPS is
usually viewed as a source of cross section and time series
data, it has a panel aspect as well. A household whose ad
dress is selected for the survey is interviewed for four con
secutive months, dropped from the survey for eight months,
and then interviewed for another four months before leaving
the sample for good. It is therefore possible to match the
survey responses of a household for up to a 16-month period
(unless the household moves from the selected address, in
which case the household that moves in is interviewed in its
place). Compared to the NLS and PSID data, the CPS
longitudinal information spans a shorter period, contains
fewer variables, and does not follow movers, but it pertains
to a much larger sample and, unlike NLS, represents all
demographic groups.
A third source of longitudinal labor market data is the
series of negative income tax experiments conducted since
the late 1960s. Each of these experiments—conducted in
New Jersey and Pennsylvania, Seattle and Denver, Iowa and
North Carolina, and Gary, Indiana—set up a pilot negative
income tax program lasting several years for a selected ex
perimental group, and also observed a control group over
the same period. The main purpose was to compare the labor
1. See Borus [3] and Kalachek [8] for more detailed inventories of longitudinal data bases.
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supply behavior of the two groups to estimate the likely work
incentive effects of a national negative income tax. The data
also can be used more generally to explore patterns of
welfare dependence and labor market experience among low
income families.
Before considering the analytic uses of longitudinal data in
general, it is worth mentioning a few of the relative advan
tages and limitations of different sources of longitudinal
data. One important comparison is between administrative
and survey data. In cases where administrative files contain
the desired data on the appropriate population, the advan
tages of administrative data are considerable. To begin with,
longitudinal collation of data already collected in the process
of program administration is less expensive than generating
the data with new surveys. Consequently, longitudinal data
bases from administrative sources often include larger
samples than surveys can feasibly interview. Also, during the
period of the sample's program participation, administrative
data are relatively free of the problems surveys have with
nonresponse and sample attrition. In addition, information
from administrative records may, in some cases, be more ac
curate than information elicited from survey respondents.
Survey data on income, for example, are sometimes
unreliable. A comparison by Herriot and Spiers [7] of CPS
and Internal Revenue Service data on earnings of the same
individuals showed discrepancies of at least 15 percent be
tween the two sources of earnings information for almost 30
percent of the matched sample. Despite the likelihood of in
come underreporting in the IRS data, the CPS earnings data
tended to be even lower. Earlier matched comparisons of
CPS and census data, initial and reinterview census data,
and census and tax data found similar evidence of income
measurement error in surveys. 2
2. Miller [12], Miller and Paley [13], and Pritzker and Sands [16].
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On the other hand, whether administrative files do contain
the desired data on an appropriate sample is a big "if." The
information collected for administrative purposes is typically
narrower than what is desired for research purposes. The
CWHS data, for instance, include only a few variables
besides earnings, and even earnings are measured only up to
the social security taxable limit. The sparseness of ad
ministrative information has led the CWBH and CLMS pro
jects to supplement their administrative data with informa
tion collected in interviews or questionnaires.
Furthermore, administrative data may not correspond to
the population of interest. The CLMS data, for example, are
insufficient by themselves for evaluating the impact of train
ing programs on earnings because the data pertain only to
program enrollees. A proper evaluation also requires infor
mation on a control group not enrolled in training programs.
Analysts of the CLMS data have resorted to CPS data
matched with social security earnings records to obtain con
trol group information.
In cases where some or all of the desired longitudinal data
must be gathered in surveys, it becomes important to con
sider the merits of retrospective versus panel surveys. Of
course, obtaining longitudinal information retrospectively in
a single interview is less costly than repeated interviewing.
The retrospective, single-interview approach also eliminates
sample attrition and yields longitudinal information more
quickly. Furthermore, retrospective data are less susceptible
to some types of response error. If, for example, a panel
survey respondent describes the same job differently in suc
cessive interviews or if different interviewers code the same
job differently, the respondent may be erroneously recorded
as having changed occupations. This sort of error is less like
ly to occur if the information is collected in a single inter
view.
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On the other hand, panel surveys are less subject to recall
error. A retrospective survey respondent that changed jobs
five years ago may fail to recall the old job or may forget
when the job change occurred. Furthermore, a retrospective
survey respondent's recollections might be biased by subse
quent events. Of course, just as longitudinal data bases
sometimes contain both administrative and survey informa
tion, longitudinal surveys can fruitfully combine the
retrospective and panel approaches. Indeed, panel surveys
typically do collect information retrospectively for periods
before and between interviews.
Finally, where a panel survey has been initiated, an impor
tant question is how long to continue the survey. This ques
tion has arisen recently with regard to whether the 1960s
NLS cohorts, originally planned to be interviewed for 15
years, should be followed for another 5 years. The answer
depends partly on the advantages of having a 20-year, rather
than a 15-year, longitudinal history. Another consideration
is that continuation of an existing longitudinal survey is a
relatively inexpensive way to obtain current data. Even if the
new data will be used largely for cross section analysis, col
lecting the data from an ongoing panel avoids the costly pro
cess of selecting a new sample and developing a new data
processing system.
This advantage is at least partly offset, however, by the
sample attrition problem. By 1981, all four of the NLS
surveys started in the 1960s had lost at least one-fourth of
their original samples. Such attrition not only reduces sam
ple sizes, but, if sample leavers differ systematically from
sample stayers, it also might cause the remaining samples to
be unrepresentative of the corresponding populations. Even
in the PSID project, where sample sizes have grown over
time because the survey incorporates new family units con
taining original sample members, it is unclear how well the
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current sample represents any population of interest.
Therefore, while extending panel surveys generates new data
economically, it may do so at a cost of progressively less
representative samples. This raises the difficult question of
when it is optimal to begin a new survey as opposed to con
tinuing an old one.

Uses of Longitudinal Data
Longitudinal data are particularly advantageous for three
types of research: the measurement and analysis of changes
in individuals' status over time, the analysis of intertemporal
relationships, and analysis that controls for unobserved
variables. Although this list of uses may seem abstract, ex
amples of each type will show that these longitudinal
analyses often have considerable practical relevance. The ex
amples are intended to serve as illustrations of the kinds of
research enabled by longitudinal data, not as an exhaustive
compilation of the findings of longitudinal research.

Measurement and Analysis of Change
Cross section data can tell what proportion of the labor
force is unemployed or describe the distribution of wage
rates of family income at a point in time. In addition, time
series of aggregated cross section data are useful indicators
of general trends and cyclical patterns in unemployment,
wages, income, and so forth. Neither cross section nor time
series data, however, can tell how many of those
unemployed in one month find employment in the next
month or how individuals' wage rates or incomes change
over time. Only longitudinal data, which track the same in
dividuals over time, can measure such changes.
An illuminating example is the gross flow data from the
CPS. These data show not only how many of one month's
unemployed are employed the next month, but also the
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magnitudes of all the other month-to-month flows among
employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation in the
labor force. Furthermore, the underlying data on in
dividuals' changes in labor force status can be analyzed to
identify the determinants and correlates of transitions
among labor force categories. For example, Barren and
Mellow's analysis [2] of May and June 1976 data on a sample
of workers unemployed in May revealed that the probability
of becoming employed by June was higher for males, those
who devoted more time to job search, and those with
relatively low reservation wages, and was negatively cor
related with receipt of unemployment insurance and length
of time unemployed.
While the CPS data on changes in labor force status il
lustrate the usefulness of longitudinal information, they also
illustrate the importance of data accuracy in longitudinal
analysis. Woltman and Schreiner [18] have reported evidence
that many of the measured gross changes may reflect
spurious response changes of persons whose labor force ac
tivity has not actually changed. According to monthly
average gross flow data for 1977, 48 percent of the CPS
unemployed in one month exited from unemployment by the
next month. In comparison, when the Census Bureau
reinterviewed subsamples of 1977 CPS respondents with
regard to the same month, 31 percent of those initially
measured as unemployed were measured in the reinterviews
as employed or not in the labor force. The high variability in
responses for the same period raises the disturbing possibility
that many, if not most, of the measured month-to-month
changes in labor force status may be comprised of response
changes that would occur even in the absence of any real
changes in status. This is not an indictment of the CPS data
in particular, but rather a general indication of the sensitivity
of flow data to measurement error and of the special impor
tance of data accuracy when addressing the more delicate
questions often asked of longitudinal data.
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Another example of the use of longitudinal data for
change measurement is research on earnings mobility. Cross
section data can reveal what proportion of workers receives
low earnings at a point in time, but to measure how many of
these low earners stay low earners and how many leave lowearnings status requires longitudinal information. Lillard
and Willis' study [9] of PSID data examined the persistence
of low-earnings status among white and black men. They
defined low earnings in a given year as earnings less than half
the median earnings of male workers in the CPS. They con
cluded that, of the low-earning men in a given year, about 45
percent of the whites and 65 percent of the blacks would still
have low earnings the next year. McCalPs study [10] of
CWHS earnings records obtained roughly similar results.
The similarity of the results from both survey and ad
ministrative data demonstrates how the validity of one study
can be assessed by comparison with another.
A recurring question in analyses of change or persistence
in economic status is whether the observed degree of per
sistence is due to "population heterogeneity" or "state
dependence." For example, Plant's study [15] of welfare
dependence asked the important policy question of whether
the tendency of welfare families to stay on welfare occurs
simply because the same factors that cause them to go on
welfare keep them there or whether, in addition, the ex
perience of receiving welfare has some sort of addictive ef
fect that induces continuing welfare dependence. It is usually
very difficult to distinguish these two types of processes
because their empirical manifestations are so similar. In
Plant's study, however, separation of heterogeneity and
state dependence was facilitated by the availability of infor
mation on both the experimental and the control families in
the Seattle-Denver negative income tax experiment. He con
cluded that the evidence of an addictive state-dependence ef
fect was weak at best. He also discovered that, if he had used
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arbitrary statistical assumptions commonly employed in
analyses of nonexperimental data, he would have been mis
led into estimating a much larger state-dependence effect.
Despite the difficulty of separating heterogeneity and state
dependence, researchers have continued to use longitudinal
data to address this important issue in such areas as labor
force participation decisions and unemployment. 3

Analysis of Intertemporal Relationships
Longitudinal data are used not only to measure change in
individuals' status over time, but also to relate individuals'
experiences or behavior at one time to other experiences or
behavior at another time. For example, an individual's early
labor market experience might affect his earning capacity in
later years, or participation in various government programs
might affect subsequent economic status. Of course,
research on such intertemporal relationships requires infor
mation on the same individuals at different points in time,
i.e., longitudinal data.
One such use of longitudinal data is Ellwood's study [4] of
the impact of teenage unemployment on later wages. He
analyzed NLS data on young men who finished school be
tween 1965 and 1967 to relate their work experience in their
first four years out of school to their wage rates in the im
mediately following years. He concluded, "Early work ex
perience has a sizable impact on wages. Controlling for in
dividual effects, experience in the second, third, or fourth
year out of school tends to be associated with wage increases
of between 10 and 20 percent a year."
Another example is Ashenfelter's study [1] of the effect of
federal training programs on the later earnings of program
enrollees. His sample included 1964 participants in Man3. See, for example, Heckman and Willis [6], Heckman and Borjas [5], and Ellwood [4].
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power Development and Training Act programs as well as a
comparison group of nonparticipants. He compared the two
groups* CWHS earnings records from 1961 to 1969 to
estimate the earnings impact of program participation. He
concluded that training did increase participants' earnings.
He estimated that men's annual earnings were raised, on
average, by $150 to $500 in the period immediately following
training and by about half as much after five years. For
women, the effect appeared to lie between $300 and $600 and
did not decline over time.

Analysis Controlling
for Unobserved Variables
The third use of longitudinal data is in analysis controlling
for unobserved variables. Often in empirical cross section
research, the goal is to estimate the effect of a variable X on
a variable Y, holding other variables constant. Frequently,
however, some of these other variables either are very dif
ficult to measure or simply happen not to have been collected
in the data base. The resulting omission of these unobserved
variables from the analysis may bias the estimation of X's ef
fect on Y.
An example is research on the wage effects of union
membership. Cross section studies have compared the wage
rates of union members and nonmembers with seemingly
similar characteristics and have found that union members
generally receive higher wages. Critics of these studies,
however, have argued that union members and nonmembers
may differ in ways not observable to the researcher. It could
be that the union members, even if they had not been in
unions, would have earned more than the nonmembers.
Although the cross section studies typically do control for
years of schooling, work experience, and other measurable
factors, the possibility remains that the estimated unionnonunion wage differential is due to other unobserved fac
tors.
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Longitudinal data provide a way of controlling for these
unobserved factors. If the effects of unobserved
characteristics of the workers stay roughly constant over
time, one can estimate union wage effects by examining how
the same worker's wages change when he changes union
status. If workers typically experience wage gains when they
become union members and wage losses when they become
nonmembers, a positive union impact on wages will be
estimated. This estimation approach implicitly controls for
unobserved fixed effects specific to individual workers by
focusing on wage changes of the same workers over time.
Mellow [11] used this type of approach in his study of
longitudinally matched CPS data for two samples, one
followed over 1974-75 and the other over 1977-78. He found
that union membership is associated with about a 7 percent
wage premium, smaller than typically found in cross section
studies, but still significantly greater than zero. Mincer [14]
conducted a similar study with NLS and PSID data on white
males and obtained similar results.
The longitudinal union-nonunion wage studies illustrate
some of the pitfalls of longitudinal analysis, as well as its ad
vantages. First, the longitudinal approach may not necessari
ly eliminate omitted-variables problems. Union joiners or
leavers may differ in systematic ways from individuals whose
union status does not change. For example, some individuals
might become nonmembers because they have been pro
moted to supervisory positions. For these individuals, union
leaving is correlated with wage gains due to a factor other
than changed union status. Other individuals may lose union
membership because they are laid off from union jobs.
These individuals may undergo wage losses due largely to the
layoff experience rather than to the change in union status.
Recognizing that such factors, if omitted, might bias the
estimated wage effect of union membership, Mincer
separately analyzed the wage changes of union joiners and
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leavers, those who stayed union members, and those who
stayed nonmembers among those who had quit their jobs
and those laid off. His results, it turned out, were not
dramatically altered. In the PSID data, for instance, relative
to job stayers who stayed nonmembers, job quitters who
stayed nonmembers experienced an average wage gain of 9
percent, and job quitters who stayed members gained 10.6
percent. In contrast, job quitters who became members gain
ed 17.2 percent, and job quitters who became nonmembers
gained only 0.4 percent. These results—showing especially
large wage gains for union joiners and especially small gains
for union leavers—remain consistent with the finding of a
positive union-nonunion wage differential.
A second problem is response error. Even in a cross sec
tion analysis, misclassification of individuals with respect to
their union membership status tends to obscure whatever
wage differences actually exist between union and nonunion
workers. According to the standard econometric analysis of
measurement errors in an independent variable in a regres
sion analysis, the resulting bias in the variable's coefficient is
proportional to the ratio of the measurement error variance
to the sum of the measurement error variance and the true
population variance of the variable. In a longitudinal regres
sion analysis, where change in a variable is the independent
variable, the bias from response error may be worse for two
reasons. First, the measurement error variance may be
greater because a response error in either of two periods can
cause an erroneous measure of change. Second, the popula
tion variance of change in a variable is typically smaller than
the cross-sectional variance in the level of the variable. 4
In the case of change in union membership status, there is
indeed reason to suspect considerable measurement error.
Mincer noted that a disturbingly high proportion of those
4. This point is developed by Taubman [17].

Longitudinal Labor Market Data

123

reporting changes in union membership status also reported
that they did not change jobs. Suspecting that many of these
job stayers had not actually changed union status, he
estimated separate wage effects for job stayers and movers.
The mover results—such as the ones mentioned above on
workers that quit or were laid off—showed more distinct
union wage effects than did the stayer results, which pro
bably were biased toward zero by response error. Similarly,
Mellow found virtually no union effect among workers that
did not change occupation or industry. These results
highlight the need to give careful attention to response error
when analyzing longitudinal data, especially if the data were
obtained in surveys. They also demonstrate the additional
care in data collection that may be necessary to obtain
answers to the more subtle research questions posed of
longitudinal data.

Summary
Recent years have witnessed significant growth in the
availability of longitudinal data on labor force experience
and behavior. These data—which follow the same in
dividuals over time through surveys, administrative records,
or social experiments—have proven extremely valuable for
three types of research: measurement and analysis of
changes in individuals' status over time (e.g., changes in
employment status or income); analysis of intertemporal
relationships (e.g., between participation in government
training programs and later economic success); and analysis
that must control for unobserved variables (e.g., the analysis
of union-nonunion wage differences). In some cases, the ex
istence of longitudinal data has opened up avenues of
research that simply could not have been pursued otherwise.
In other cases, longitudinal data have enabled the examina
tion of previously untestable analytical assumptions and
consequently have increased the reliability of research find
ings.
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Despite its great advantages, longitudinal analysis also in
volves a special problem. Many of the questions addressed
with longitudinal data are more subtle than those asked of
cross section data, and their analysis is often sensitive to
response error. This sensitivity implies first that researchers
should attempt to minimize response error in their choice of
data bases. In some cases, for example, data from ad
ministrative records may be more accurate than survey data.
In addition, longitudinal analysts should examine their data
for evidence of response error and explore how response er
ror might affect their results. The sensitivity of longitudinal
analysis to response error also raises the question of whether
longitudinal data collection efforts ought to devote more
resources to the reduction of such error.
The overwhelming usefulness of longitudinal data for the
analysis of many issues has been established by a continuing
succession of valuable studies. Because collection of
longitudinal data is still a relatively new endeavor, though,
several issues associated with their collection need explora
tion. One important question is how to weigh the sample at
trition problems of continuing an old panel survey against
the advantages of following the panel over a longer period as
well as the large fixed costs of initiating a new survey.
Similar questions pertain to the choice between retrospective
and repeated interviews. Finally, there exist important and
unexplored tradeoffs in allocating survey resources between
interviewing more individuals and improving the accuracy of
data on those that are interviewed. Some analysis and
perhaps even purposive experimentation with alternative ap
proaches to these issues should make the longitudinal data
developed in the next decade even more valuable than those
of the past decade.
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Summing Up
(based on selective hearing)
Sar A. Levitan
The George Washington University
As this conference was proceeding today, a horrible
thought occurred to me: Can you imagine the setback for
labor force and productivity statistics if anything were to
happen to the collection of experts in this room? Now that
we have completed a very fruitful and stimulating conference
without mishap, I remain the only obstacle to partaking in
the happy hour. Let me rush through with my comments,
hoping that they will not detract from the high level pro
ceedings of the day.
First, I will summarize what I heard here, even though it
may be based on my selective hearing.
Second, I will add some observations which I had hoped
would have been made by others. While our data system
should be designed to capture the net social impacts of
domestic policy changes, there is also a feedback effect.
Federal funding allocations and administrative decisions
reached by policymakers not only affect society, but they
also influence the workings of such public agencies as the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Census Bureau. The con
cern is that the products of these fine statistical organizations
are facing deterioration.
127
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Third, we should look at the system as a whole and not
just individual surveys. Clearly, data collection and publica
tion are not ends in themselves. The question is whether the
entire data system helps policymakers formulate and
evaluate policies. In many cases, I believe there are serious
gaps which we should span.

Parts of the System
Each of the speakers centered in on one part of the total
data system. Leon Taub made some thoughtful comments
about the Current Population Survey (CPS). He indicated
that the richness of the CPS data are adequate for meeting
the macroeconomist's basic needs because total employ
ment, unemployment, and other aggregated data respond in
a predictable pattern to business conditions. Of course, like
any other good researcher who makes a living from
forecasting trends, Leon displayed an understandable ap
petite for a few more numbers; but speaking as a
macroeconomist, he gave the CPS a clean bill of health. He
did, however, have some reservations when he took off his
macroeconomist hat and put on his microeconomist
chapeau, which he also wears on occasion. On this level, the
data are not adequate to solve many labor market-related
problems. He suggested several directions for developing
further information, including counting discouraged
workers in the unemployment totals, producing better data
for local labor markets, and measuring the impact of
changes in employment status on household consumption
patterns.
After Leon's suggestions concerning new data on labor
market effects, Robert Taggart picked up on this same sub
ject. He showed how a great deal more knowledge and in
sight about labor market operations can be milked from the
CPS for very little extra expenditure. He advocated the link-
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ing of March CPS data on individual and family income and
earnings with labor force status.
The question Bob Taggart raised goes to the heart of the
problem: To what extent can we continue to base policies on
concepts that were developed in the 1930s and which have
not been updated? Beyond numbers reflecting labor force
status, we need estimates that link income and earnings with
a person's household status. Employment or unemployment
data do not measure economic hardship. Bob showed ways
in which income, household conditions, and labor force
status can be combined to produce estimates of real
economic hardship that persist to plague our society. I hope
the Census Bureau and the BLS will pay attention to these
newer concepts.
Another part of our data system is the establishment
survey which supplies the base ingredients for productivity
measurements. Elliot Grossman and George Sadler were
highly critical of the productivity data that BLS derives from
the establishment survey. There was a time when the arcane
mysteries of productivity data were mostly of interest to a
select group of economists and statisticians, but now they
make headlines. Politicians, media persons and even
economists on the make are finding these days that a sure
fire way to gain attention is to come up with some catchy
plan to boost America's slumping productivity.
Elliot and George have questioned not so much the
various riverboat gambles the United States has taken to get
on a noninflationary growth path; rather they have warned
us that we may not have enough information—or the correct
data—to navigate the riverboat. We most often have equated
the overall changes in economic productivity with only labor
output per work hour. More recent concepts, including total
factor productivity, consider the relationship between all in
puts per unit of output. Unlike the older index, this concept
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captures the substitution of capital and energy for labor.
Last year, total factor productivity growth was even lower
than labor productivity gains.
However, BLS experts warned us today that total factor
productivity estimates harbor many problems. For example,
how should capital be aggregated, and how should capital be
depreciated so that one has a net capital figure? Despite these
and other problems, BLS hopes to come out with productivi
ty estimates that move beyond only labor productivity by
1983. I hope they do this because I believe that sound
analysis of America's growth problems will require data on
more than output-per-work hour data.
Orley Ashenfelter and Gary Solon next discussed the state
of longitudinal data and how this newer part of the informa
tion system can enrich our understanding of labor force
operations. As Orley and Gary already pointed out, I wish
we had more data on the cost of these longitudinal numbers
because while they provide better insights, they are also ex
pensive. I believe we need to know the comparative costs of
this data source compared with using the same outlays in
enriching the CPS.
Also, for how long are these longitudinal data good? For
example, if one starts a cohort of people between 45 and 59
in 1968, then how long should one continue the survey
before too many individuals meet their heavenly rewards?
The case for longitudinal data would be far stronger if we
knew more about their relative costs and benefits and how
we could design panels so that we would maximize the infor
mation returns while we minimize expenditures. These con
cerns are vital in an era of strict budget cutting of nondefense
spending.
If I've learned any one message today, it is that we should
not rely upon any single number. Clearly, we heard that
message from Ken Prewitt of the Social Science Research
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Council. Ken spoke at lunch and did not have a formal
paper, but his comments on social indicators are important.
Social indicator data are derived from longitudinal surveys,
such as the one published by the University of Michigan
covering 5,000 families, the Ohio National Longitudinal
Survey and from public opinion surveys. They illuminate
many significant developments that may not be captured in
our traditional labor force numbers. Also, as Ken
noted—and this backs up the need for longitudinal data—a
growing number of researchers and media analysts are in
terested in change over time and not just a single snapshot
picture. Good labor market analysis should consider the in
formation obtained from the emerging social indicators.

Media and Policy Needs
While we cannot rely on a single number, we must
remember that when the network television news people
report monthly unemployment conditions, they cannot cram
that many numbers into a 20-second segment. When
unemployment rises one-tenth of a percentage point to
almost 10 percent, all we hear is that this is a record
unemployment rate since the 1930s. Can the networks put
over the concept that a monthly rise of one-tenth of 1 percent
is not statistically significant? We need more than one
number, but reporters, just like economists, face
resource—in this case time—constraints. The needs of the
media people must be considered in forming our data
system.
Beyond the introduction of new concepts, such as
economic hardship and total factor productivity, is the
challenge to factor whatever numbers are generated into the
thinking of policymakers and the general public. We can in
troduce the best new concepts, but without this education
process all they will do is remain unused and collect dust.

132

Summing Up

Deterioration?
Each of the speakers was assigned to examine one part of
the total system. While we concentrated on the major labor
force surveys, it was beyond the scope of the four papers to
comment on recent developments in the general state of
labor force data. As part of the budget reductions for nondefense spending, the federal government will provide 20
percent less funding for labor force and other economic data
in fiscal 1983 than was spent in 1980. This major budget
reduction does not even include the impact of inflation. A
statistical system needs ideas but numbers cannot be pro
duced, analyzed and disseminated without money. The
system, therefore, faces serious deterioration.
But beyond these funding problems, there is a different
form of deterioration that may be even more serious in the
long run. Current federal policy contributes not only to the
erosion of the existing data system, but also to the stifling of
vital research and development that could lead to the in
troduction of new concepts and methods. There is no better
way to destroy the excellence of the total system.
I call your attention to a report that Secretary Raymond
Donovan issued, as required by law, when he commented on
the recent work of the National Commission on Employ
ment and Unemployment Statistics. Secretary Donovan
repeated again and again that—and this is a direct quote—he
"cannot in good conscience" recommend any of the Com
mission's proposals that cost money. I stopped counting this
repeated refrain when I ran out of my 10 fingers. Maybe
somebody here from BLS has counted exactly how many
times he said that.
Secretary Donovan's comments were quite different from
the response of the previous Secretary of Labor Ray Mar
shall. The difference in how they made decisions was a great
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as the actual difference in results. Six months after the Com
mission filed its report, former Secretary Marshall said he
was in favor of counting discouraged workers as
unemployed. But rather than accept or reject the Commis
sion recommendations, he indicated that he would await fur
ther study by BLS before he would factor these findings into
his final decision. In opposition to this type of reasoned ex
amination of the Commission's proposals, the present
Secretary of Labor just completely rejected anything that
would cost any money. To make sound decisions one should
examine not only the costs but also the benefits obtained
from a public investment. While the Reagan administration
presumably champions cost-benefit estimates, it appears to
have rejected using any sound cost-benefit analysis in this
case.
This administration puts a great stress on volunteers, and
the Commission suggested a triennial survey of volunteers
because of their impact on GNP, and also because there
often are very few differences between the work performed
by volunteers and paid workers. The cost of such a survey
would be well under $300,000 based on BLS estimates and
updated for inflation. Public policy calls for more volunteer
work, and yet we know next to nothing about the volunteer
workforce. Also, we know very little about the extent to
which volunteers use their experience to enter the paid labor
force. Despite the administration's expressed concerns, the
Secretary of Labor rejected the recommendation for the
survey.
There are many other examples that are similar to the
volunteer workforce data proposals. A major tenet of the
Reagan Administration is reducing the role of the federal
government by turning over many functions and programs
to the states and local governments and providing whatever
aid the federal government gives to states and localities
through block grants to the states. However, state and local
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labor force data are often quite poor. In fact, in many cases
the numbers are more guesses than reliable estimates within
acceptable margins of error. The Commission made many
suggestions to improve state and local data including a
boosting of the CPS sample size. This would have yielded
reasonably reliable state data as well as statistically signifi
cant data for key groups in the population. Instead of
boosting the CPS sample, it was cut down to 60,000 under
recent budget reductions.
There is a serious question concerning the quality of the
statistics if the sample decreases or is even kept at the same
level given growing population shifts. For example, data on
Hispanics and blacks (and in particular black youths) need to
be improved. If "New Federalism" is to be more than a
slogan or a subterfuge for cutting federal aid, then state and
local data need to be improved.
The damage that we are doing to the system cannot easily
be reversed. It seems that under this administration we are
going to have to live with deteriorating data which are not as
responsive to, and reflective of, real conditions. It took
many years to create this system, and it could lose the trust
of policymakers and the general public. This would hurt all
of us, no matter where we stand on other social issues.
I agree with Henry Clay that "statistics are no substitute
for judgment," but it is irresponsible to design policies that
are based only on sheer ideology (be it liberal or conser
vative) and gut feelings. Our labor force and productivity
data systems could be very strong resources that help put
America back on course. Yet given recent trends, I fear we
may be dismantling the compass and letting the sextant grow
rusty.
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